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INTRODUCTION

Corporate governance scholarship seeks to evaluate and suggest
legal mechanisms for improving governance and thus the welfare of
shareholders and (perhaps) other constituencies. Prevailing legal
approaches, however, avoid direct evaluation of substantive policy disagreements. Consider, for example, the recent battle for control of
the H. J. Heinz Company Nelson Peltz, whose hedge fund has
invested in Heinz stock, wants five seats on its board of directors so
that he can put in place governance changes; CEO William Johnson
has resisted efforts to change the board.1 Corporate law knows little
I

See Steven Gray, Ketchup Fight: Peltz, Heinz CEO

2006, at C1.

Go at It, WALL ST.

J., Aug. 4,
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about ketchup. And so, it focuses on procedure to ensure that the
agents (Johnson and other managers) will act on behalf of principals
(Peltz, shareholders, and perhaps other stakeholders), for example by
regulating issues such as who pays the bills associated with shareholder votes.
Stock markets evaluate the impact (and beneficiaries) of managerial decisions more directly, providing real-time predictions of the discounted future profits that corporations will produce. Changes in
stock price, however, have virtually no role in corporate governance.
A CEO and members of a board may take actions that they expect will
win the approval of the market, but neither statutes nor charters insist
that a corporation follow the market's advice. This may seem puzzling. A principal goal of corporate law is to maximize shareholder
wealth, and if stock market trends provide an objective, informed, and
speedy assessment of whether a corporation's decisions advance that
goal, then perhaps corporate law should take account of them in
2
some way.
A resolution of the puzzle lies in the difficulty of interpreting
stock price reactions to corporate decisions. A stock price change
might reflect some other event simultaneous to the decision or simply
noise. In the Heinz case, the current stock price may reflect some
probabilistic assessment of whetherJohnson or Peltz will prevail multiplied by the expected benefit from their respective plans, but shareholders deciding how to vote or whether to sell may be unable to
unpack the relevant numbers. Advisors of various kinds, like analysts,
shareholder advisors, and proxy firms, may offer advice, but these
views may be tainted by self-interest or other extrinsic considerations,
and will be noisy as well. Stock prices also can be misleading because
under current insider trading law, a firm's stock price does not fully
reflect all available information about the firm, thereby undermining
3
its value as a governance mechanism.

2 While stock market predictions in general play an important role in motivating
corporate actors, this is as a result of individual acceptance of the general validity of
the stock price metric, not as a result of any systematic scheme. When the stock price
is falling, directors will be more willing to fire the CEO, and shareholders will be more
willing to seek out new directors. See Jerold B. Warner et al., Stock Prices and Top
Management Changes, 20J. FIN. ECON. 461, 487 (1988) (finding increased CEO turnover for firms in financial distress). But no rule mandates personnel changes in
response to market assessments, and corporations do not even adopt decisionmaking
procedures that give presumptive weight to market assessments.
3 Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REv. 857, 869-72 (1983).
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If stock market predictions were more easily interpreted and
more fully informed, corporations might place more weight on them
in their decisionmaking, and corporate law might nudge corporate
decisionmakers to give such predictions increased weight. A new
technology, known as "prediction markets" or "information markets," 4
makes this possibility less hypothetical. Prediction markets are markets in which various contracts with payoffs tied to uncertain future
events are traded. For example, the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM),
run by the University of Iowa Tippie School of Business, includes prediction markets for elections, economic indicators, and other future
uncertainties. 5 Prediction markets have been shown to forecast better
than, or at least as well as, public opinion polls, 6 public experts, 7 and
private experts.8 Rather than revisit the prediction market literature,
we assume for the purpose of this Article that prediction markets are
generally an accurate predictive tool. We ask how corporations can
improve governance with prediction markets.
We argue that these markets, whether voluntarily deployed by
firms or, more ambitiously, required by law, can solve many nettlesome corporate law issues. Our thesis is that corporate prediction
markets have the potential to reduce information costs (by reducing
asymmetries between a firm and its investors without disclosing corporate secrets), agency costs (by making shareholder monitoring easier),
and the transaction costs of decisionmaking (by making corporate
4 For a dynamically updated bibliography of prediction market research, see
Papers on Event Derivatives (Event Futures), Prediction Markets and Prediction
Exchanges (Betting Exchanges), http://www.chrisfmasse.com/3/3/papers (last visited Mar. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Papers].
5 See Univ. of Iowa, Henry B. Tippie Coll, of Bus., Iowa Electronic Markets,
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). For a discussion of how
the IEM and like markets might inspire a revolution in management, see Barbara
Kiviat, The End of Management?, TiME, July 12, 2004, at 4.

6 SeeJoyce Berg et al., Accuracy and Forecast Standard Error of Prediction Markets 33 (July 2003) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/
iem/archive/forecasting.pdf (reporting that the IEM gave results closer to actual election results than election polls did in 451 of 596 polls).
7 See, e~g., Refet Gfirkaynak &Justin Wolfers, Macroeconomic Derivatives:An Initial
Analysis of Market-Based Macro Forecasts, Uncertainty and Risk 13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11,929, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/wi1929 (finding that prediction markets slightly outperform surveys of
experts in estimating economic statistics).
8 See, e.g., Kay-Yut Chen & Charles R. Plott, Information Aggregation Mechanisms:
Concept, Design and Implementation for a Sales ForecastingProblem 13 (Cal. Inst. Tech.,
Social Sciences Working Paper No. 1131, 2002), available at http://www.hpl.hp.com/
personal/Kay-YutChen/paper/ms020408.pdf. Other business experiments with prediction markets are described infra Part I.A.

2007]

PREDICTION

MARKETS

FOR

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

1347

and insurgent decisions more informed, cheaper to make, and easier
to understand). As a purely business matter, these markets may allow
firms to extract and process information from all parts of the organization, encouraging anonymous whistleblowing and reducing the
potential for fraud and waste. Prediction markets also can help
ensure that corporations act in the interests of shareholders or other
constituencies.
In the battle for control of Heinz, markets might estimate the
value of the Johnson plan versus the Peltz plan. The mere existence
of these markets, whether required by law or voluntarily created by
managers or raiders, might have eliminated the conflict by providing
a reliable assessment to different corporate players. Johnson and
other managers may still have self-interested motivations (as, perhaps,
may Peltz), but markets could help discipline their actions by exposing decisions expected to lower stock price. If the conflict nonetheless ended up in litigation, courts might consider evidence from the
prediction markets to assess the controversy, rather than focusing
solely on procedural issues.
These markets are still in early stages, and the initial challenge,
not explored here, is to ensure that the law does not stymie voluntary
experimentation. 9 In the long term, however, legal institutions might
encourage or even mandate prediction markets. Courts could, for
example, require firms to use prediction markets to analyze the
impact of certain fundamental business transactions as a precondition
of receiving the lenient treatment of the business judgment rule.10
Regulators could require firms to use these markets to inform the
market about financial and operational details, perhaps as an alternative or complement to other approaches to disclosure. Mandatory
prediction markets on subjects like earnings results would be more
reliable, less costly to implement, and more difficult to manipulate
than the internal controls systems required under current law. We
explore these and other potential applications in more detail below.
Corporate decisionmaking and governance should be an attractive application for prediction markets relative to other areas of law,
both because corporations have already begun employing simple versions of prediction markets, and because stock markets already have a
significant informal role in corporate decisionmaking. The legal literature on prediction markets, however, has ignored the possible use of

9
10

See infra note 94.
See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
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1 Thomas Malone, a business
these markets as tools of corporate law."
increasingly are decenschool professor, has argued that businesses
that prediction markets may serve
tralizing decisionmaking and notes
the appliprocess, but he does not explore
as one of many tools in1this
2
cations discussed here.
with prediction markets is
Early corporate experimentation
13
in several ways. First, corporaencouraging, but it has been limited
to serve as inputs into other
tions have created prediction markets
assess corporate decisions directly.
corporate decisions, rather than to
impact of decisions on variables
"Conditional markets" assessing the
1 4 Second, corof our discussion.
such as stock price will be the focus
so far solely to move informaporations have used prediction markets
corporation. We will emphasize the
tion to decisionmakers within the
predictions, bringing to all invespossibility of corporations releasing
while avoiding an unequal playing
tors the value of inside information
with prediction markets have been
field. Third, existing experiments
We anticipate that as prediction
conducted by the firms themselves.
they could become weapons in
markets gain respect and credibility,
created by large individual
corporate politics, for example
shareholders.
markets with a focus
In Part I, we sketch the basics of prediction
We also briefly address conon their use in the corporate context.
markets, including liquidity,
cerns raised about the efficacy of these
II describes difficulties in corpoaccuracy, and manipulability. Part
how prediction markets can help.
rate information flow and explains
with alternative approaches,
It compares prediction market solutions
insider trading rules,
including mandating internal controls, relaxing
flow itself
Information
and enhancing insider trading regulation.
applispecific
how
III considers
should reduce agency costs, but Part
improve corporate governance. It
cations of prediction markets could
could be used to assess corporate
explains how prediction markets
Simply Efficient
to our analysis are Saul Levmore,
11 The articles that come closest
Markets and the
Electronic
Iowa
the
from
Lessons
Markets and the Role of Regulation:
Manne, Insider
L. 589, 594 (2003) and Henry G.
CoRP.
J.
28
Exchange,
Stock
Hollywood
CORP. L. 167,
J.
31
the Dog That Did Not Bark,
Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and
have lessons
might
markets
suggest that prediction
183-85 (2005). Both, however,
of legal regutools
as
used
be
might
markets
for legal regulation, not that prediction
markets, see infra
to the legal literature on prediction
citations
other
some
For
lation.
notes 41 and 62.
12

(2004).
FUTURE OF WORK 31-37, 73-126
THOMAS W. MALONE, THE

13 See infra Part I.A.
Svs., May-June
Decision Markets, IEEE INTELLIcENT
14 See, e.g., Robin D. Hanson,
corporate
considering
briefly
markets and
1999, at 16, 16 (discussing conditional

applications).
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strategy and personnel decisions, and how prediction markets might
be used to assess the interests of constituencies other than shareholders. We cover many possible proposals here, recognizing that each
could be developed and scrutinized in far greater detail, because our
purpose is to provide an overview of the use of prediction markets
rather than specific policy recommendations. We close by offering
some preliminary conclusions, identifying some open questions, and
identifying possible avenues for future research.
I.

A

PRIMER ON CORPORATE PREDICTION MARKETS

The traditional design structure for a prediction market is simple:
A market sponsor introduces one or more tradable contracts that provide for payment contingent on some future event. Each contract
either pays off a fixed amount if the event resolves in a particular way
(for example, if a particular candidate wins an election), or it pays off
an amount that varies depending on some number that can be determined in the future (for example, one penny per percent of the vote
that one candidate receives). The prices at which trades occur provide at least an approximate market-based prediction of the event. 15
A.

Early Corporate Innovators

Kay-Yut Chen, an employee of Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, and
Charles Plott, an experimental economist, conducted the earliest
apparent study of the prospect of using these markets to improve corporate decisionmaking. 16 They hoped that prediction markets would
provide a means of aggregating "small bits and pieces of relevant
information [that] exists in the opinions and intuition of individuals
who are close to an activity,"'1 7 and thus of measuring what James
Surowiecki has called "the wisdom of crowds."18 Participants were
given real money that they could use in the game. Each market predicted the future monthly sales of various products. Meanwhile, Hewlett-Packard continued to assign some employees to produce forecasts.
Chen and Plott concluded that the consensus market predictions were
a "considerable improvement" over official forecasts-beating official
forecasts fifteen out of sixteen times in one experiment and six out of
15 For an argument that prediction market prices can be interpreted as probabilities, see Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, InterpretingPrediction Market Prices as Probabilities (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 2092, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract921642.
16 See Chen & Plott, supra note 8, at 112-17.
17 See id. at 3.
18

JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, at xiv (2004).
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ten in another-and that this result was robust to different possibility
specifications of the method of calculating the probability forecast. 19
One should be cautious before drawing broad conclusions from a
single study. Perhaps Hewlett-Packard's official forecasters were
unusually bad, in which case the market's beating them was no big
feat. Hewlett-Packard's initial success with using prediction markets
to improve internal estimations, however, has been replicated at a
variety of other firms in numerous industries. For example, drug
maker Eli Lilly established an internal prediction market to estimate
drug development success. 20 It allowed about fifty employees from a
range of corporate areas to trade on six drug candidates; the market
aggregated toxicology data, clinical trial results, and marketing data
better than any existing mechanism, correctly forecasting the three
most successful drugs. 2 1 Similar successes have been observed at Intel,
which ran an experiment in which a prediction market outperformed
existing mechanisms for allocation of manufacturing capacity; 22 at Siemens to predict a project completion date more reliably than official
forecasts; 2 3 at GE to generate new business ideas; 24 and at France
25
Telecom.
B. Designs for Future Corporate Experimentation
Firms have used a variety of different market and contract types
in current experiments with this technology, only some of which may
be useful in governance and other corporate law issues we investigate
in this Article. We are particularly, though not exclusively, interested
in subsidized, conditional prediction markets that forecast stock price
contingent on different decisions that the firm might make. We will
briefly catalog some of the key features of these markets. Our immediate goal, however, is not to offer full descriptions of the relevant
mechanisms, let alone full evaluations of any associated technical
19 See Chen & Plott, supra note 8, at 12-13.
20 See James M. Pethokoukis, All Seeing All Knowing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 30, 2004, at 54. For a list of firms served by one leading provider of prediction
market technology and advice, see News Futures, http://us.newsfutures.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
21 See Pethokoukis, supra note 20, at 54.
22 See Kiviat, supra note 5.
23 See Alexander Tabarrok, In Defense of PredictionMarkets, RED HERRING, Sept. 23,
2003, http://hanson.gmu.edu/PAM/press/redherring-9-23-03.htm.
24 See Michael Totty, How to Decide? Create a Market, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2006, at
R9.
25 See Project Destiny, http://qadh.pair.com/-ftrd/destiny/other.cgi (last visited
Mar. 25, 2007).

20071

PREDICTION

MARKETS

FOR CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE

26

already actively considering.
problems, issues that the literature is
the mechanisms that we enviRather, we merely intend to describe
their technical feasibility and to
sion, to offer a brief explanation of
decisionmaking and corporate
explain their relevance to corporate
law.
Market Makers
Subsidized Markets with Automated
would be subsidized at sigWe anticipate that prediction markets
markets, with the subsidy levels
nificant levels for corporate prediction
the decision. In the absence of a
proportional to the importance of
zero-sum game, and someone will
subsidy, prediction markets are a
derives utility from participagenerally participate only if the person
to win money from others who
tion alone or if the person expects
this may be sufficient incentive for
have entered the market. While
is unlikely that the kind of widesome firms or for some markets, it
would arise without substantial
spread use of markets we describe here
subsidies.
of cash, in-kind payments, or
These subsidies can be in the form
decisions, like whether to
other forms. For extraordinary corporate
the CEO, a single prediction marpursue a merger or who should be
in subsidies. At this subsidy
ket might be given millions of dollars
not only to participate, but also
level, individuals will have incentives
to develop sophisticated models
to seek out relevant information and
a subsidy of several million dolof whatever is being predicted. While
costly, it is comparable (or less)
lars for a particular market may sound
and on fees for professional serthan firms currently spend internally
proxy solicitation firms,
vices (e.g., lawyers, compensation consultants,
bankers, etc.) in such cases.

1.

Wagering,
Dynamic Pari-MutuelMarket for Hedging
26 See, e.g., David M. Pennock, A
CONFERENCE ON
ACM
5TH
THE
OF
PROCEEDINGS
and Information Aggregation, in EC '04:
Servan-Schreiber et al., Prediction
171-78 (2004); Emile
ELECtRONIC COMMERCE 170,
at http://
MARKETS 243, 246-49, available
Does Money Matter?, 14 ELECTRONIC

Justin Wolfers &
bpp'wharton'upenn'edu/jwolfers/Papers/DoesMoneyMatter'pdf;
DICTIONARY OF
PALGRAVE
NEW
in
and Practice,
Eric Zitzewitz, PredictionMarekts in Theory
(forthcoming 2008),
Markets:

Steven Durlauf eds., 2d ed.)
ECONOMICS (Lawrence Blum &
Optimal
4
483; Paul Tedock & Robert Hahn,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-88
StudRegulatory
for
(AEI-BrookingsJoint Center
Liquidity Provisionfor Decision Makers
QuesOpen
Five
Zitzewitz,
Eric
Justin Wolfers &
ies, Working Paper No. 06-18, 2007);
No. 1975,
Paper
Discussion
Labor,
of
for the Study
tions About PredictionMarkets (Inst.
http://ssrn.
Five Open Questions], available at
Zitzewitz,
&
Wolfers
[hereinafter
2006)
InforCombinatorial
of
44
et al., An Experimental Test
com/abstract=88 83; John Ledyard
http://hanson.
at
available
manuscript),
mation Markets (Feb. 2005) (unpublished
gmu.edu/testcomb.pdf.
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Even with subsidies, the number of participants in any given prediction market might be relatively low, resulting in low liquidity and
therefore lower reliability. Most prediction markets use a continuous
double auction method that matches willing buyers and sellers in a
way that poses no risk for the exchange. If some participants are
expected to have excellent information, however, others will be hesitant to trade with them. Fortunately, recent market designs can, in
effect, provide infinite liquidity. We will summarize one such
approach here,2 7 the "market scoring rules" devised by Robin Hanson.28 This approach builds on the concept of a scoring rule, a function that is used to reward a single individual for making a
probabilistic prediction, with more accurate predictions receiving
29
higher rewards.
Under the market scoring rule, any individual can make the first
prediction as to a particular outcome, and then anyone can displace
the previous predictor by committing to pay off the previous predictor
according to the scoring rule, and then announcing a new prediction.
The most recent prediction becomes the consensus prediction of the
market. In laboratory experiments, the market scoring rule outperforms more traditional market mechanisms at predicting outcomes in low-liquidity environments, especially in cases where
information asymmetry is a problem.30
From a user interface perspective, the market scoring rule can
appear to be no different from traditional markets. A user can buy or
sell any number of contracts, with the price of the contracts changing
with each incremental purchase. This approach ensures that traders
will be able to cover any losses and that traders will lose no more than
they have invested. In effect, these designs provide for an automated
27 An alternative approach, developed and patented by Yahoo!, is a dynamic parimutuel market, a variation on traditional pari-mutuel markets, like those used in
horse race betting. See Pennock, supra note 26, at 174.
28 See Robin Hanson, CombinatorialInformation Market Design, 5 INFO. SYs. FRONTIERS 107, 109-13 (2003).
29 See, e.g., Morris H. DeGroot & Stephen E. Fienberg, The Comparison and Evaluation of Forecasters, 32 STATISTIC AN 12, 20 (1983) (discussing scoring rules and their
limitations).
30 Ledyard et al., supra note 26, at 12 ("The market scoring rule had the best
performance overall, clearly beating all other mechanisms in one environment, and
doing as well as any other mechanism in the other environment."). A practical design
advantage of the market scoring rule is that it provides a relatively simple approach
for creating a subsidy. The maximum subsidy is simply the largest amount that someone might receive under the relevant scoring rule. In effect, the market sponsor
needs to worry only about paying the last predictor, though in practice, the market
sponsor will serve as a bank to clear all transactions.
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to buy or sell contracts at
market maker, with the system offering
Even if there turns out
prices that depend on the current predictions. mere possibility that
markets, the
to be only one trader in these
with the eventual resolution of
along
another trader will come along,
rule approach, will provide that
the scoring rule in the market scoring
predictions.
trader with an incentive to make honest
2.

Conditional Markets

likely to be of significant value
Corporate prediction markets are
outcomes of a variety of potential
only if they can predict future
the impact of events that
courses of action, which means estimating
the impact of a potential corporate
might not ever happen. Assessing
is tricky, especially if the marstrategy that might not be implemented
the strategy. A prediction
ket recommends against implementing
on Heinz's stock price if the
market designed to forecast the impact
two problems: (1) How are
firm adopts the Peltz plan must address
not adopt the Peltz plan?; and
contracts resolved in case Heinz does
circularity, estimating not just the
(2) How can the markets avoid
also the probability that the plan
absolute impact of the plan, but
depends on the prediction of the
would be adopted, which in turn
market itself?
various approaches to implementThe literature has developed
3
allow the prediction of one variaing "conditional markets," ' which
of a particuar event. For our
ble contingent on the occurrence
practical feasibility of such marlimited purpose of establishing the means of implementing them.3 2
one
kets, it is sufficient to describe
will be
provide that all market transactions
The market sponsor can does
not occur, so all market participants
"unwound" if the event
invested over time, perhaps with
receive back any money that they
used and widely accepted in betinterest. 33 This approach is already
by Tradesports.com: A tradable
ting markets, such as those hosted
judicial nominee will receive
contract on how many votes a particular
that the candidate actually
in the Senate carries an implicit condition
34
also addresses the circularity issue.
receives a vote. This approach
31

& Zitzewitz, Five Open Questions,
See, e.g., Hanson, supranote 14, at 17; Wolfers

supra note 26, at 19-20.
scoring rule to
approach, using the market
32 Hanson describes an alternative
110-16.
at
See Hanson, supra note 28,
create many combinatorial markets.
use a similar
hosted on Tradesports.com,
those
like
33 Many existing markets,
will Harriet

markets like "How many votes
approach to unwind implicitly conditional
Miers receive in the Senate?"
her nomination from consideration,
34 When Harriet Miers withdrew
on how many votes she would receive.
Tradesports.com unwound the bets
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An optimistic prediction market forecast may make a particular decision more likely, but it should not generally have a marked effect on
35
the conditional predictions.
C.

Obstacles to Market Accuracy

In discussing prediction market design, we have already
responded to one significant potential criticism: that prediction markets might have too little liquidity to make meaningful assessments.
This subpart discusses several other obstacles to prediction market
accuracy. We recognize that these obstacles might well delay deployment of prediction markets and might reduce their effectiveness.
Nonetheless, in the corporate context, there are particular reasons to
believe that these problems can be overcome.
1. Inefficient Markets
A significant general objection is that markets can be inefficient,
and in particular that they may be prone to speculative bubbles.
Whatever the merits of this controversy, stock markets appear nonetheless to be superior to alternative approaches to distributing capital,
such as assigning government officials or panels of experts to judging
the future effectiveness of various companies. Likewise, while there is
some recent evidence that suggests that some individuals do occasionally "beat the market," past performance is not a reliable indication of
future results. 36 And so, it would be difficult to designate specific individual corporate forecasters and have confidence that they will be the
ones who will beat the market. The better approach is to allow these
forecasters to bet in the market, and thus to influence prices, even if
35 A caveat is that if predictions become self-fulfilling prophecies, the evaluation
of rejected alternatives may be unreliable. See infra Part I.C.3 (addressing this issue).

A separate caveat is that nonconditional markets can become self-defeating prophecies. For example, if a market to predict an earnings restatement is run after the
initial statement of earnings, then an indication of a problem ultimately may lead to
the correction of the problem, preventing the person trading on the information

from profiting. Design alterations, such as markets predicting final earnings numbers, can avoid this problem. See infra Part I.C.1 (discussing related markets).
36 See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 23 (8th ed.
2003) (explaining the theory that securities prices exhibit a "random walk" unaffected
by past price trends); Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner's Curse, 2 J. ECON.
PERSP. 191, 193-96 (1988) (demonstrating the difficulty of obtaining assets for less
than their true value); Anna Bernasek & Burton Malkiel, The Man Your Fund Manager
Hates, FORTUNE, Dec. 20, 1999, at 134; Burton G. Malkiel, Indexes: Why the Critics Are
Wrong, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1999, at A30.
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problems that may lead to
such arbitrage will only imperfectly offset
occasional mispricing.
will not necessarily be
Moreover, inefficiencies of equity markets
markets are subject to bubproblems in prediction markets. Equity
of earning fortunes from passive
bles in part because of the possibility
the other hand, have no inherent
investments; prediction markets, on
recognize that they cannot simply
upward trend. Participants will
that they must make predictions on
throw money into the market, but
might form, for example
specific markets. Occasional bubbles
some trades as reflecting
because market participants misinterpret
have occurred in laboratory experiments,
information. Such 3bubbles
7 Derivatively informed trading in any event can
though only rarely.
in general increases market effibe a rational market strategy that
in which the strategy leads the marciency, even if there are occasions
ket astray.
2.

Manipulation

markets for decisionmakAn objection to reliance on prediction
in the decisions might seek to
ing is that individuals with an interest
Someone who seeks to push a
manipulate the prediction markets.
information, however,
market in a direction not justified by valuable
enter the market and push it back
increases the incentive for others to
a laboratory experiment that gave
in the other direction. Indeed,
incentives to manipulate found
some prediction market participants
market accuracy, because the
that such incentives in general improved
the liquidity of the market and
attempts at manipulation increased
38 A separate experiment in which
the potential profits from trading.
the IEM in randomly determined
the author sought to manipulate
have only small and temways indicates that attempts at manipulation
39
porary effects on market prices.
in Experimental Asset
Wiegelt, Information Mirages
37 See Colin Camerer & Keith
Smith, Stock Market
L.
Vernon
&
David P. Porter
Markets, 64J. Bus. 463, 490 (1991);
(1994); Lucy F.
114-21
111,
FIN.
MATHEMATICAL
Bubbles in the Laboratory, 1 APPLIED
(Fed. Reserve
in Laboratory Asset Markets 14-15
Ackert et al., The Origins of Bubbles
http://ssrm.com/
at
No. 2006-6, 2006), available
Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper
abstract=903159.

in an ExperiInformation Aggregation and Manipulation
38 See Robin Hanson et al.,
(2006).
& ORG. 449
mental Market, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV.
Stock Markets: A
Strumpf, Manipulating Political
S.
Koleman
&
39 Paul W. Rhode
(Jan. 2007) (unpublished
of Observational Datap 31
05 -17
a p e r s / M a n ip - a p e r - 2 0
ar /
Field Experiment and a Century
http://www.unc.edu/-cig
at
available
manuscript),

(KS).pdf.

1356

.....
NOT

1

n
..
VAM

1 AW

REVIEW
REVIEW

[VOL.

82:4

might add some noise to
It remains possible that manipulation
participants may
prediction markets, because nonmanipulating to which others are
the degree
slightly underestimate or overestimate
should not add any systemmanipulating. But at least manipulation
should increase liquidity
atic bias, and the prospect of manipulation
are in any event in a
and thus reduce noise overall. Corporations
of manipulation in prediction
good position to reduce the danger
example, in an internal prediction
markets that they control. For
of the corporation, corporate offimarket involving only employees
to
threaten to punish anyone found
cials might explicitly or implicitly
market.
have attempted to manipulated the
3.

Unlikely Conditions

and automated market
We have already shown how subsidies
in markets generally. But what if
makers address the liquidity concern
event occurring is low? Corporathe probability of the conditional
price impact of decisions that are
tions might want to assess the stock
in a market in which, say,
unlikely to occur. Would anyone trade
that the market would be
there was a ninety percent chance
the answer is probably yes, but the
unwound? With sufficient subsidy,
increase the amount of subsidies
risk inherent in such trading would
necessary.
solutions to this problem.
In any event, there are several possible
events and one for very low
We will consider one for low probability
events, the market could be
probability events. For low probability
market, with the first market prestructured as a two-stage conditional
market. Let us assume that the
dicting the outcome of the second
to make a decision on June 1 on
firm setting up the market wants
of its business units, but the market
whether it should spin off one
(say, a ten percent chance) that
thinks that there is a low probability
a
action. The firm would establish
the firm would actually take this
the
starting, say, one week before
basic prediction market (call it B)
predict the impact of the spin-off
decision is to be made, that would
be a low-subsidy market in which
on the stock price. Market B would
to participate and little trading
few individuals would be expected
to
probability of the event coming
would occur because of the low
therefore not be in aggregating
pass. The value of this market would
to
traders would have little incentive
or processing information, since
earlier
point for another,
research, but in providing a reference
market.
would be established, say,
This earlier market (call it Market A)
would be heavily subsidized, and
six months before the decision date,
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would predict the outcome of Market B. Traders in Market A would
thus be trading based on what they think traders in Market B will predict about the eventual decision (which will be made after Market B).
As one of the authors has shown in prior work, it is irrelevant that
Market B would involve trivial trading and little information generating activity. 40 It is sufficient to generate trading volume in Market A
that Market B will make a prediction, or more precisely, that there is a
chance that Market B will make a prediction. If the price in Market A
failed to reflect market fundamentals, then someone in Market B
would have an incentive to trade on Market B. (This assumes that the
market design allows a single person to trade against an automated
market maker.) It is possible, of course, that no one will trade on
Market B, since someone with information would have already traded
on it in Market A. If no trades occur in Market B, then Market A is
resolved based on its own final trading price. Even in this case, Market A's predictions are disciplined by the possibility of trading in Market B, and there is no need to unwind transactions for low probability
events.
For very low probability events (perhaps less than a one percent
chance, as determined by a separate nonconditional market), a "normative market," that is a market that aggregats opinions, might be
useful. 4' Instead of relying on Market B to discipline Market A, the
firm could simply designate a particular individual (or set of individuals) to make a decision during the period when Market B would otherwise be operating. For example, before starting Market A, the firm
could state that the firm will ask a randomly selected shareholder to
evaluate the decision (or, perhaps, to select among various consulting
firms that offer to conduct more thorough analyses). Market A would
then be established to predict the estimate of the shareholder or the
consulting firm. Because the random selection would be made only
after Market A closed, the market would predict the average view of
all eligible analysts.
4.

Unavailable Information

Another problem may arise because of informational asymmetries between the decisionmaker and any market participant. For
example, a corporate decisionmaker, such as a CEO, might have information and experience unavailable to most market participants, and
40

Michael Abramowicz, Deliberative Information Marketsfor Small Groups, in INFOR101, 115-17 (Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Teflock eds. 2006).
41 See Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and
Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 933, 938-39 (2004).
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would not be as effective as
one might think that a prediction market
in cases where an individual has
that individual decisionmaker. Even
can be useful. The superior
superior information, prediction markets
a prediction market should not be
information objection implies that
is
decisionmaker. But the question
used to discipline or constrain the
will perform as well as a corporate
not whether a prediction market
but whether a prediction market
decisionmaker would in isolation,
of a corporate decican improve on the initial recommendations
that supplementary contributions
sionmaker. The literature suggests
improve overall decision
to, and checks on, informed decisionmakers
quality.

42

point about shareholder votLucian Bebchuk has made a similar
have information unavailable to shareing. 43 Insiders may sometimes
can give an official recommendation
holder voters, but a corporation
voters. There is no reason to
on how to vote to those shareholder
will place too little weight
believe, Bebchuk thinks, that shareholders
44 This is even more strongly true in
on the official recommendations
If some participants in prediction
the context of prediction markets.
the official corporate recommendamarkets place too little weight on
to take contrary positions. In
tion, others will have a profit incentive
suggests that a corporate position
cases in which a prediction market
is that the deference that should
is misguided, the consensus estimate
on account of good informabe given to the corporate decisionmaker
the intrinsic case against the decition is not sufficient to overcome
to believe that such a market
sion, There is no theoretical reason
than right.
consensus is more likely wrong
announce an official recomEven where a corporation does not
provide useful and easily digestimendation, prediction markets may
a
other decisionmaker. Consider
ble information to the CEO or
the
firm's stock price following
prediction market estimating the
The CEO or the board may think
adoption of the proposed strategy.
potential participants in this marthat it has superior information to
from experience and data to ego.
ket for a variety of reasons, ranging
the sources of information
Even so, there is no reason to exclude
might signal an issue that manreflected in the market. The market
corroborate management's view.
agement is unaware of, or it may
on consulting firms to corroborate
Firms routinely spend large sums
69 AM.
Making in Business Organizations,
Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision
EcoN. REv. 493, 503 (1979).
69 U.
Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers,
43 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case
42

L. REV. 973, 977-78 (2002).
44 Id. at 978.
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the conclusions already reached by management, and the costs of
establishing a prediction market will likely be far less. At the least, the
market may inform the CEO about wider perceptions of the strategy,
a valuable piece of information that a CEO might not be able to reliably obtain from other sources.
The possibility that corporate decisionmakers might have information unavailable to market participants does, however, present a
potential technical complication in interpreting conditional market.

45

A market prediction can confound an evaluation of the effects

of a particular decision on the probability of an event with an analysis
of what the fact that the decision was made indicates about the
probability of the event. In the corporate context, suppose, for example, that a prediction market is used to predict corporate stock price
conditional on a decision by the corporation to sell a major asset.
Suppose, further, that market participants believe that there is some
probability that the corporate decisionmakers have information indicating that the firm is in worse financial shape than the market
believes, and that if this is the case, the firm would need to sell the
asset. Then, even if it is unequivocally a good decision to sell the asset
regardless of financial circumstances, market participants would recognize that if the firm does sell the asset, that could be an ominous
sign of the firm's financial health. Therefore, the market might predict that the stock price conditional on the sale will be lower than the
current stock price.
Despite this example, we doubt that this problem is serious in the
corporate context, because conditional market predictions are suspect
only in a case in which the corporation's decision affects the market's
perception of the initial state of the firm. These cases will be rare for
publicly traded corporations that are widely covered by analysts, rating
agencies, the media, and large shareholders; publicly released prediction markets in which insiders can trade, as described in Part II, can
make these cases rarer still. Sometimes, a decisionmaker may be
expected simply to have better information than the market about the
effects of a decision. In this case, the market prediction might exaggerate the market's perception of the benefits of a particular
approach. But as long as separate markets predict the consequences
of taking different paths, including doing one thing and not another,
the market should still recommend the path that it thinks is best.

45

For further discussion of this problem in conditional markets, see Abramowicz,

supra note 41, at 938-39.
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Minor Decisions

So far, we have considered decisions that will have a significant
effect on stock price. If the effect of a decision on stock price is relatively small, then conditional markets might not be able to tease it
out.4 6 To take an extreme example, suppose that a corporation
wishes to decide whether to mow the grass outside corporate headquarters once or twice a week. As a theoretical matter, this might have
some effect on shareholders: mow too often, and the corporation is
wasting money; mow too little, and the corporation's image might suffer. The effect, however, is so small that it is likely to be swamped by
noise. If, for example, a market prediction is derived from comparing
the last price of transactions on two conditional markets corresponding to the two possible decisions, then it might be happenstance
whether someone happens to make a purchase from one conditional
market or another.
There are, however, possible solutions that would enable prediction markets to assess relatively minor decisions. First, conditional
markets might be calibrated to predict not stock price at some point
in the distant future, but instead stock price reaction to the announcement of a particular decision. Although other simultaneous news or
announcements may also affect stock prices, these cannot be anticipated, and so the market prediction of the expected stock price
change should be reliable even if the ex post measure is noisy. This
approach should work as long as there remains some uncertainty
about what the decision will be just before the announcement.
Second, a conditional market could predict something other
than the stock price of the corporation. One possibility is to use a
normative prediction market in which what is predicted is a subjective
assessment of a particular decision. Ideally, the subjective assessment
that disciplines the market should occur some time, perhaps several
years, after the decision is or is not instituted. Delay can limit the
danger that a normative market will merely impound the conventional wisdom.
II.

IMPROVING CORPORATE INFORMATION FLOW

Much of corporate law seeks to design structures or processes to
move information efficiently within a firm and from a firm to the market. In this way, corporate governance can be seen as the process of
allocating power in ways that tend to minimize the sum of various
costs, such as information costs, transactions costs, and agency costs.
46

Id. at 1009.
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help lower the sum of transacWe argue that prediction markets may
For example, better information
tion, information, and agency costs.
managerial and board decisioncan allow shareholders to monitor
may also be less expensive than
making more easily; these markets
flows to equity markets.
alternative means of facilitating information
markets have advantages
In particular, we will argue that prediction
to improving information flow,
over several alternative approaches
abolition of insider trading
including institution of internal controls,
regulation.
rules, and enhancement of disclosure
A.

Flow of Information to the CEO and the Board

the other recent corporate
In Enron, WorldCom, and many of
were able to hide valuable
scandals, certain individuals or groups
and others responsible for
information from managers, the board,
This was possible because
either making or monitoring decisions.
only after information has been
decisions within most firms are made
hierarchy, each one of which
processed at numerous levels of firm
time, and resources, but also
adds not only the real costs of people,
by those who might put
error costs and the potential for opportunism
The law's response has been
personal profit ahead of firm welfare.
example, mandatory interlargely structural and organizational-for
incentives for increasing monnal control systems, penalties and other
legal protections for
itoring by directors, and increased
4 7 There already exists, however, a potential marketwhistleblowers.
information through an
based mechanism for efficiently conveying
stock price. We will look briefly
organization to decisionmakers-the
then offer a better alternative.
at the benefits of this approach, and
Stock Prices
1. The Virtues and Limitations of Following
traded corporation is that
One of the great virtues of a publicly
can be assessed through a simple
the overall health of the corporation
its market capitalization, that is,
arithmetic operation, by calculating
number of shares. Stock price
the stock price multiplied by the
behavior. CEOs may be fired
accordingly is a central focus of firm
and CEO contracts
when the stock price slips relative to competitors,
Too
of the Act, see Douglas M. Branson,
47 For a discussion of the basic reforms
Era,
Post-WorldCom
Governance in the Post-Enron,
Many Bells? Too Many Whistles? Corporate
of the
of the procedural and political history
analysis
an
For
58 S.C. L. REv 65 (2006).
Quack Corporate
of
Making
the
and
Act
Act, see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
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are designed to provide incentives to take actions that will increase
investor confidence.

48

While there are risks of this focus on stock price, particularly
when CEOs have incentives to present incomplete information to the
market to ensure short-run increases in stock price, the discipline provided by stock prices advances the interests of shareholders, because
the stock price proxy for corporate health reduces information costs.
Even those who will scrutinize a corporation's health by a careful
examination of a wide range of sources will often start with stock price
as a reference point. They will then seek to find hidden sources of
value that the market has not yet recognized (making the corporation
undervalued), or hidden perils that the market has not yet appreciated (making the corporation overvalued).
The improved information that the stock price provides also
reduces a corporation's agency costs. Agency costs have been defined
as the sum of the monitoring expenditures that a principal incurs to
supervise the agent, the bonding expenditures that an agency incurs
to show faithfulness to the principal, and the residual loss from the
49
nonalignment of the incentives of the principal and the agent.

Because the stock price mechanism provides a means of monitoring
the management of the corporation as a whole, it reduces the need
for shareholders to spend money on alternative means of assessing the
performances of management and on procedures (such as shareholder votes) that might discipline management decisionmaking.
Meanwhile, high-level managers can bond themselves by agreeing to
accept some compensation in the form of stock options rather than
cash. Because the stock price improves monitoring and bonding, it at
least has the potential to reduce the residual loss from agency costs.
But stock prices have several significant disadvantages, especially
when it comes to using them to make internal firm decisions, like
whether to follow a particular strategy or who should sit on the
board. 50 First, the stock price is too blunt, representing the per share
48 See StewartJ. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An EmpiricalAnalysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 231,
263-64 (2006) (showing that CEO contracts routinely included performance-based
bonus and equity-based incentives to align shareholder and management interests).
49 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 308 (1976).

50 Another potential objection to reliance on market prices is that maximization
of shareholder wealth might not be the only goal of a firm. Some nonprofit firms,
after all, might be seen as maximizing other variables, and even public corporations
might care about constituencies besides their shareholders. See generally Einer
Elbauge, Sacrificing CorporateProfits in the PublicInterest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733, 776-818
(2005) (arguing that the law does and should give managers discretion not to maxi-
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value of the expected cash flows for all future periods discounted back
to the present, rather than a narrowly tailored market view on a particular issue. Any number of firm-specific or market-wide developments
can thus be expected to affect the stock price in ways that may be
difficult to unpack from the particular relevant event being analyzed.
The bluntness of the stock price also may discourage trading. An
investor may have information about one thing (say, a positive view
about one project), but offsetting information about something else
(say, a negative view about another project). The firm and market will
not benefit from information disclosure, even if the basis for trading
could be decoded.
Second, the stock price does not reflect all available information,
since those with the very best information about the firm are legally
prohibited from trading on the basis of that information. Insiders
with information about the success or failure of corporate projects,
public auditors with opinions about the veracity and completeness of
firm financial statements, and outside counsel with views on the firm's
compliance with the law, are all forbidden from transmitting their
information to the market. In addition, an insider with material, nonpublic information about one aspect of the firm's business will be
deterred from trading even if in possession of valuable information
about another aspect of the firm's business, if such trading could give
rise to trading liability. These realities seriously undercut the utility of
the stock price as a decision input (or determinant) for corporate
decisionmakers.
Third, in a world of reasonably effective insider trading laws, markets respond only to the public release of information about the firm.
Thus, a firm deciding between one of two projects will only get the
market's view on its choice once it has made the decision. This is
valuable for some purposes, like disciplining managers, but is much
less valuable for evaluating the merits of the two projects, because
decisions announced and then unmade carry significant costs both in
terms of actual expenditures and losses in reputation.
Fourth, stock prices also may suffer from upwards bias due to the
limitations on short sales found in various federal laws and regulations. 5 1 If the stock price represents the average of the bets made by
mize shareholder wealth). We do not claim that stock price should be the sole relevant criterion in assessing a corporation's decisions. It is ordinarily a very important
criterion, and at least it should be useful to assess corporate decisions and management against this metric. Prediction markets also might be used to assess how decisions will affect other constituencies. See infra Part III.C.
51 See Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, andDivergence of Opinion, 32J. FIN. 1151,

1160 (1977).
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those who think the stock will rise and those who think it will fall, but
those who think it will fall are disadvantaged in the number and type
of bets they can make compared with those who think it will rise, then,
all else being equal, the stock price may be upwardly biased in the
short run. As David Schizer explains: "If pessimists cannot trade, optimists are likely to have a disproportionate influence on prices." 52 This
phenomenon reduces the informational value of stock prices at any
point in time, as it slows the "market's progress toward an equilibrium
price ."5

Prediction markets do not suffer from any of these shortcomings:
they can be narrowly tailored to specific decisions,5 4 they can be used
internally to assess different future possibilities, and they are not
biased by any laws restricting trading. Prediction markets allow
employees as well as other insiders and market participants to convey
information not just about the overall health of the firm, but about
particular issues facing it. The markets can help alert decisionmakers
to bad decisions or missed opportunities sufficiently early that they
can try to apply pressure to reverse the changed policy. Designs like
the market scoring rule make it easy to bet that a prediction is too
high without trading short.
2.

Problems Impeding Information Flow

Not only are stock prices generally insufficient to inform managers about the wisdom of particular future courses of action, but firm
decisionmaking in general is also complicated by barriers to efficient
information flow. Prediction markets can help avoid the distortions
that occur when gatekeepers decide what information to present to
their immediate superiors, turning information flow into a costly version of the children's game "telephone," or, worse, a way of misleading bosses and corporate stakeholders. At the same time, prediction
markets help avoid the danger that employees will keep information
to themselves lest the information interfere with interpersonal relationships, reputation, or even job status; this is especially true if anonymous trading is permitted. Prediction markets also give the few who
recognize the heuristics and biases of others incentives to trade
against those biases. We will consider how prediction markets can
52 Michael R. Powers et al., Market Bubbles and Wasteful Avoidance: Tax and Regulatory Constraints on Short Sales, 57 TAx L. REv. 233, 240 (2004).
53 Id.
54 See Manne, supra note 11, at 185 ("Virtual markets even have some benefits the
actual stock market does not, such as the ability to segregate specific causes of share-

price changes.").
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hidden profiles, and
solve each of these three problems-hierarchy,
heuristics and biases-in turn.
a.

Hierarchy

hierarchical. Every organiDecisionmaking in firms is generally
be it an individual or group, that
zation has a single decisionmaker,
available information. The problem
must make decisions based on all
necessary to make a decision is often
is that the volume of information
are one solution. The head of
overwhelming. Hierarchy and filtering
all
division is responsible for getting
each business unit or team or
the
up
it
reporting
it, and
information from that group, synthesizing
can sometimes lead to an
approach
chain of command. While this
information reaching the ultimate
optimal quantity and quality of
costs, and opportunistic or selfdecisionmaker, it also has significant
interested actors may abuse it.
by the government about
Consider the information generated
not
destruction. The President did
alleged Iraqi weapons of mass
but
branch,
by the executive
receive all the information collected
5 5 Each of the
his various advisors.
rather only data filtered through
each of their data collectors, may
various departments, not to mention
or personal agenda. High-ranking
have had a particular ideological
the
and analyzing information, but
advisors are tasked with filtering
too by their subordinates.
data that they received is filtered
business firm of considerable
Similar situations obtain in every
in the above with "CEO," and the
size. Replace the word "President"
divisions, and the story is the
political departments with business
faces decisions of consequence,
same. Like the president, the CEO
to merger decisions, with litfrom certification of financial statements
espeproblem of information flow is
tle first-hand observation. The
hundreds
With
multinational firms.
cially important for today's large,
a firm like General Electric can
of divisions in dozens of countries,
by
by aggregating those submitted
prepare financial statements only
manager into progressively broader
each division head or country
organizational categories.
asymmetry problem
One potential solution to the informational
and incentives. This is the most
is to improve organizational design
breakdowns, both in government
common response to informational
Significant Moment
on His Sword: Colin Powell's Most
55 Karen DeYoung, Falling
12.
at
2006,
1,
Oct.
PoST MAG.,
Turned Out to Be His Lowest, WASH.
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and in firms. The creation of a Director of National Intelligence 56
and the mandatory internal control provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 200257 are both examples of this type of solution. It is difficult
to align incentives between principal and agent, however, and firms
are always plagued by organizational costs, regardless of how well they
are put together. These costs can be large, especially when individuals
can benefit from deception.5 8 It may or may not be worthwhile for a
particular organization to invest more money in improving information transmission up each level of the hierarchy.
An alternative strategy is to facilitate the flow of information
around the hierarchy. 59 An individual employee who dissents from an
official report or sees a false idea propagating can try to go around the
hierarchy or blow the whistle. These actions, however, are risky,
because reputations and jobs are at stake. Protections for
whistleblowers can encourage employees to raise concerns loudly but
are difficult to calibrate properly. Excessively generous protection can
allow some employees to make large amounts of money on either frivolous charges or charges that the employees did little to uncover.
Blowing the whistle can also be a form of job protection, because
some firms may be reluctant to fire employees for fear of bad press or
a lawsuit. Inadequate protection, meanwhile, can lead many employees to keep their concerns to themselves. Whistleblower provisions, in
any event, seem unlikely to be effective in encouraging the flow of
60
information in cases where there is no question of illegal conduct.
56 See Philip Michael Romero, An Immunological Approach to Counter-Terrorism and
InfrastructureDefense Law in Electronic Domains, 14 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 101, 125

(2006).
57 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. IV 2004).
58 For a discussion of the difficulties of designing effective incentives, see Bengt
Holmstrom, The Firm as a Subeconomy, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 95-99 (1999) and
Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, The Firm as an Incentive System, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
972, 984 (1994).
59 Some firms have developed creative ways to help alleviate the costs of hierarchy. For example, Cisco CEO John Chambers hosts a monthly "birthday breakfast"
during which he chats informally with employees having a birthday in that month.
Adams Lashinsky, Lights! Camera! Cue the CEO!, FORTUNE, Aug. 21, 2006 at 27.
Although such sessions may occasionally help improve decisionmaking, their purpose

and real value, if any, is as a morale building tool.
60 A recent example of the limitations of such provisions is Carnerov. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006). In Carnero, the First Circuit held that the
whistleblower provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley were not clearly intended by Congress to

have extraterritorial effect. Id. at 8. Thus, when Carnero was fired after reporting
financial improprieties to Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC), an American corporation, he had no recourse under Sarbanes-Oxley, even though Carnero was employed
by BSC's Argentinian and Brazilian subsidiaries. Id.
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Recent research suggests that whistleblowing, including the new procedural protections for whistleblowers found in Sarbanes-Oxley, is not
an effective mechanism for uncovering corporate fraud. 61 An
employee who believes that a supervisor has made a good faith but
mistaken decision is unlikely to go over the supervisor's head. Organizations that encourage such insubordination risk exacerbating workplace tensions and wasting high-ranking officials' time.
Prediction markets provide a much simpler approach to allowing
information to flow to top decisionmakers. They offer several advantages. First, prediction markets can prevent gatekeepers from filtering
and distorting information. For example, allowing individuals to predict sales would reduce the possibility that errors (either innocent or
profit-seeking) propagate through the hierarchy all the way to the top.
Employees would have incentives to identify and correct distorted
information, especially if they can trade anonymously.
Second, prediction markets can increase the possibility that those
most capable of making accurate predictions will do so. Trades in
prediction markets will be weighted by intensity of belief or knowledge. At times, of course, individuals will be overconfident of their
positions, but on the whole, weighting seems likely to improve information. Even if a hierarchical organization picks excellent managers,
predictive capacity is only one aspect of managerial skill. Indeed,
sometimes an organization might want to select managers who are
overconfident about the possibility of achieving success, because these
managers can be effective motivators. Prediction markets may allow
others to compensate for the predictive weaknesses of these managers, while still allow these managers to coordinate projects.
Third, prediction markets can boil down information to the concrete numbers that will be of most interest to top decisionmakers. For
example, markets allowing employees to predict whether the firm will
have to restate its financial statements would provide the CEO a simple barometer for assessing the veracity and completeness of the
financial statements. This may be more useful, especially for a CEO
not trained in accounting, than a detailed explanation of arcane
accounting decisions. Of course, top decisionmakers will also sometimes rely on hierarchical decisionmaking structures to produce analysis to explain the numbers, but at least the CEO will be able to identify
61 See Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? 4
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891482 (finding
that over two-thirds of frauds are identified by individuals outside the firm, and that
Sarbanes-Oxley's enhanced protections have not led to more whistleblowers or better
protection for whistleblowers).
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to be at variance with the coninstances in which the analysis appears
sensus prediction.
Hidden Profiles

b.

markets can help overcome is
A related problem that prediction
held by a group of individuthe tendency for less than all information
decisionmaking. Cass Sunals to be incorporated into group-based
individuals, like the employees of
stein points out that while groups of
of valuable information, the deliba firm, have as a group a great deal
aggregate and process this inforerative model used by most firms to
62 For one, the social pressures within any
mation is flawed.
to sit quiet even though they may
organization lead some members
effect known as "hidden
have valuable information to share-an
on information
63 The result is that there is an emphasis
profiles.
managers at
when
cascade
can
shared by the group. Bad decisions
potentially open to differing pereach level of a hierarchy, initially
views when facing recommenspectives, place aside their conflicting
dations from subordinates.
of these concerns. IndividuPrediction markets can combat both
themselves nonetheless might
als who might keep information to
it may only take one or a small
trade on that information. Meanwhile,
analyzed a problem to trade on
number of people who have correctly
Of course, employees will
their information and prevent cascades.
their reasoning, and so
often trade on information without explaining
and liquidity constraints of
some information cascades will persist,
have the correct analysis to limit
employees may lead even those who
market. But prediction markets
the degree to which they correct the
at least should help.
c.

Heuristics and Biases

arise from the heuristics
Additional obstacles to information flow
ability to collect and disor mental shortcuts that impede individuals'
and efficiently. Recent work in
seminate information effectively
individual employees are risk
behavioral economics reports that
excessively high discount rates to
averse, are overly optimistic, apply
limitations when processthe future, and suffer from other cognitive
64 Unfortunately, employees most affected by such
ing information.
StatisticalMeans, Deliberation, and Informa62 See Cass R. Sunstein, GroupJudgments:
(2005).
tion Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 994
994-96.
at
Id.
63
Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications,
64 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping
COLO. L. REV. 649, 673-96 (2006).
U.
77
Ideas,
of
and the Fallacy of the Marketplace
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biases may be most likely to succeed. As Donald Langevoort recently
wrote in describing the Enron scandal: "[T]raits such as over-optimism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy and a deep capacity for ethical
self-deception are favored in corporate promotion tournaments, so
that people who possess them are disproportionately represented in
executive suites. ' 65 This should result not only in the occasional massive fraud, but also in far more numerous small mistakes that can
decrease firm profitability.
These factors alone or in combination can contribute to potential
problems. For example, risk-averse employees may place great
emphasis on a small danger of losing their jobs. Therefore, they may
go along with bad decisions or even participate in frauds originated at
higher levels. Studies also show that corporate leaders, like most of
us, are plagued by excessive optimism. 66 This trait may cause individu-

als in the information hierarchy to be overconfident in ways the
impede information flow. A sales person might overestimate
expected sales, and, if things do not work out as expected, be tempted
to cover up for fear of being fired. This course of action is especially
likely for individuals suffering from overconfidence bias, because the
bias will apply also to an employee's estimate of the probability of getting away with misbehavior. Even where overconfidence does not
cause employees to break laws or rules, it may lead them to make
excessively optimistic progress reports to their supervisors, ultimately
leading to poor decisionmaking.
Use of prediction markets might allow some frauds to be uncovered by decisionmakers far up the chain of command or outside the
firm, as various individuals would have incentive, be it financial or otherwise, to trade against the official report to management. The markets effectively give voice to those who otherwise would remain silent
due to various pressures or expected costs from speaking out. The
biases that prevent good decisionmaking may also distort the information flow to the market, but the misinformed or overly optimistic
trades of these individuals will attract those with better information
and less bias. Those who are aware of others' cognitive imperfections
65 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the
Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others, and the Design of Internal
Controls, 93 Gro. LJ. 285, 288 (2004).
66 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
CorporationsMislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L.
REv. 101, 130-48 (1997) (noting that corporate information flows are affected by
managerial optimism, and other problems of managerial heuristics, including cognitive conservatism, decision simplification, and self-serving beliefs).
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will recognize profit opportunities, and their trading should at least
partially correct for biases.
B.

Flow of Information to the Markets

So far, we have seen how internal firm prediction markets can
help reduce the error costs of information flow in hierarchical organizations, as well as enable truth telling in a low risk, cost-effective manner. Of perhaps even more relevance to legal scholars and
policymakers is the role these markets can play in improving information flow from the firm to shareholders, creditors, and other market
participants. In this subpart, we argue that prediction markets can
prove more effective at transmitting information to markets than several other possible strategies: imposing auditing and internal controls,
relaxing insider trading laws, and enhancing mandatory disclosure
requirements.
1. Prediction Markets Instead of Internal Controls
A common element of all the recent wave of corporate scandals
was an apparent breakdown in firms' internal and external auditing
functions, which in theory should bring relevant information to the
markets. For example, at Enron, Andrew Fastow and others manipulated internal reports to serve their personal ends, and Arthur Andersen failed in its obligation to make sure that Enron's financial
statements represented a true picture of the firm. 67 In response,

policymakers in Congress, the SEC, and the newly created Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), adopted a series of
requirements designed to improve the reliability of public disclosures
of financial reports: beefing up accounting expertise and independence on boards, banning accountants from selling consulting services to firms they serve, requiring annual reports on the efficacy of
new internal control systems for financial reporting, and mandating
financial statement certification by the CEO and CFO. 68 Fraudulent
certification carries a possibility of multi-million dollar fines and two
decades in prison. 69
While these reforms raise the cost of malfeasance and may help
deter abuses, the consensus is that the costs are high. For example,
67 Larry Cata Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizingand Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MIcH. ST. L. REv. 327, 409-10; see Larry E.
Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to CorporateFraud:A Critiqueof the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 39 (2002).

68
69

Ribstein, supra note 67, at 11-18.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(2) (Supp. IV 2004).
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is so great that many firms are
several studies show that the burdenhassle, and legal risks from this
"going private" to avoid the costs,
70 Even supporters, like Langevoort, have doubts.
uncertain process.
of a "firm-specific central intelliHe wonders whether the institution
the qualitagence agency.

.

.

both
to spy on line managers and audit

disclosure" will be beneficial,
tive and quantitative aspects of their
be
such an approach] should not
pointing out that the "costs [of
71
new approach relies on directors
underestimated." Ultimately, the
to enforce a new discipline on manor auditors or other gatekeepers
requirements (for directors
agers, either through new independence
protections (for lawyers and employand auditors) or whistleblowing
be complicit in wrongdoings, may
ees). These parties, however, may
given that they may too suffer from
be undermotivated to act properly
be rational in not acting to stop an
cognitive or other biases, and may
calculation of their own selfalleged fraud based on a reasonable
interest.
are increasing dramatically
As important, the costs of auditing
of auditing services or the finanwithout any clear sign that the value
is improving. Part of the problem
cial information provided by firms
best approach to summarizing audit
is that no consensus exists on the
vigorous debates on accounting
information. There are currently
to firm audits (rules or stanissues ranging from the general approach
executypes of disclosures (should
73 Greater
dards?) 72 to the details of specific
in footnotes or tables?).
tive compensation be disclosed
the possibility that auditors will
expenditures on audits can reduce
ensure that information is
miss a red flag, but they will not necessarily cost-efficient manner.
useful,
conveyed to the market in the most
alternative or complement to
Prediction markets are a7 potential
4 allowing information to flow around a
Section 404 internal controls,
information flow up a hierarhierarchy rather than merely improving
that there is a possibility that cerchy. Suppose that a CEO believes
sales from one period into another.
tain executives have been shifting
market forecasting whether the
The CEO could create a prediction
over some period of time,
firm will be required to restate its earnings
of earnings will be. Because most
or what the firm's final statement
could profit on markets with suffrauds materialize eventually, traders
70
71
72
2006,
73

See Ribstein, supra note 67, at 39.
Langevoort, supra note 65, at 315.
6,
over Rigid Reporting, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
See Robert Bruce, Flexibility Is Favoured
at 12.
if Shares Rise?, N.Y. TIMES,JUne 2, 2006,
See Floyd Norris, Which Bosses Really Care

at C1.
74 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404.
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ficiently long time horizons. Or, the market might predict more specifically whether an investigation into possible earnings shifting will
find wrongdoing in a particular group. Such a market could help
focus investigators' efforts, lowering costs and reducing the danger
that they will reach a premature conclusion.
A similar approach could be applied to any number of current
dilemmas where corporate law and accounting intersect. Prediction
markets could be used to assess whether particular accounting treatments or disclosures will be found to be accurate. An ambitious
approach would create a prediction market corresponding to each significant numeric line of a disclosure, forecasting the correct amount
that should be input on the relevant line. The firm could commit to
spending extra resources investigating some percentage of disclosure
lines, say ten percent, chosen at random. The markets could be structured as conditional markets, anticipating the correct disclosure that
will be identified in an investigation if the particular disclosure line is
selected for a random examination. Using the two-stage market
approach described above, employees could profit from trades even
in cases in which disclosures did not turn out to be randomly selected.
It might appear that these strategies will work only if accounting
rules are refined sufficiently so that there is an objective correct
answer to the relevant accounting questions, but if such refinement
occurs, then prediction markets might seem to be less useful. An
advantage of prediction markets, however, is that they can effectively
aggregate different potential views on questions. For example, if different accounting investigators would be expected to reach different
conclusions about a particular number disclosed, the market will produce a weighted average of the different views. Prediction markets
can thus work effectively even if some accounting standards remain
vague. Indeed, with prediction markets, vagueness might be preferable to the extent that it makes it less likely that firms will legitimately
but misleadingly exploit loopholes.
Because managers and firms have only limited incentives to
reform their accounting practices, the impetus for prediction markets
someday might come from regulators. When these markets are sufficiently reliable and the design questions we and others have raised are
addressed, it might be sensible for the SEC or other regulators to
require firms to use these markets to aggregate and process information about a firm's fiscal health. Firms would set up or participate in
prediction markets designed to estimate various financial metrics, like
earnings. Even at this relatively early stage, the SEC should consider
testing these markets or encouraging firms to experiment with them,
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such experimentation will not
at the very least by assuring firms that
lead to enhanced regulatory scrutiny.
of external auditors in the
The ongoing debate about the role
illustrates the limitations of tradirecent options backdating scandals
the SEC and PCAOB argue that
tional approaches. Regulators at
investigating more fully the grantauditors shirked their duties by not
while auditors defined their job
ing of options by the firms they audit,
are not there to ferret out wrongdoin a limited way, arguing that they
to take firm documents at face
ing and that they should be allowed
be expanded to include an investivalue.7 5 The role of auditors could
or forensic accountants or consulgatory role, or specialized auditors
approaches may be costly and
tants could be required, but these
ineffective.
Firms could install boardPrediction markets are an alternative.
a
a set of core issues, like whether
monitored prediction markets on
might
The SEC someday
firm's reported earnings are accurate.
or participate in markets created
require firms to set up these markets
to
might also sensibly require firms
by the SEC itself. Stock exchanges
courts
state
requirements. Finally,
use such markets as part of listing
requirements by requiring
might put real teeth into duty-to-monitor
to deploy these markets in a monboards under certain circumstances
about how exactly to design these
itoring capacity. Questions remain
mandatory versus voluntary, what
markets, what subjects should be
these markets, what should be disentity is best positioned to require
issues are beyond our scope, and
closed and when, and so on. These
in
a theoretical matter at this stage
are, in any event, unresolvable as
the evolution of these markets.
Trading
Prediction Markets Instead of Insider
is as a harmless end-run
Another use of prediction markets
Markets can give insiders an
around insider trading restrictions.
the firm and the market while mutincentive to reveal information to
are the basis for insider trading
ing the normative concerns that
thinker in this
76
Henry Manne, the leading anti-establishment
laws.

2.

WALL ST. J.,
Woes Beg the Question of Auditors' Role,
75 See David Reiley, Backdating
be permitshould
firms
problem is whether auditing
June 23, 2006, at Cl. A related
reported
firm's
a
about
color
or
as impressions
ted to disclose "soft information," such
themselves.
numbers
the
is,
that
information,"
numbers, or be limited solely to "hard
soft inforlimit of their obligation to provide
the
push
to
auditors
expect
One would
real story
the
them
give
to
and others that rely on it
mation, while investment bankers
of the practice.
of the
of the firm will push for continuation
TradingRules on the InternalEfficiency
Insider
of
Effect
The
Haft,
J.
76 See Robert
1051, 1067-71 (1982).
Large Corporation,80 MicH. L. REv.
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area, has long argued that insider trading could increase market efficiency and could help smoke out corporate frauds. 7" In a recent article, he argued that the success of corporate prediction markets should
78
highlight the potential benefit of relaxing insider trading laws.

Insider trading, however, may impede the efficient allocation of capital. On anonymous exchanges, market makers do not know whether
they are trading with someone with inside information or someone
without, so they increase the bid-ask spread in order to compensate
for the risk that the trade is with the former. This increase in bid-ask
spreads reduces the number of possible transactions in the market79
place, and therefore results in less market liquidity.
Perhaps the most obvious and simple corporate prediction market is one that would attempt to replicate the informational component of the firm's stock price by simply forecasting future stock
prices. 80 A sample contract might be: "What will Firm X's stock price
be in six months?" The argument against the applicability of insider
trading laws is that participants would not be buying or selling a
"security," a requirement for application of federal securities law. The
key legal questions are whether a prediction market contract qualifies
as a "stock" or as an "investment contract."8 ' It is almost certainly not
a "stock," because it provides no voting rights, 2 and an investment
contract requires investment in a "common enterprise" 3 rather than
a mere prediction.- The question is not entirely free from doubt, however. Participants might be considered to be trading in a derivative of
a security, and thus fall within the regulatory ambit of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), though the CFTC's jurisdiction
over prediction markets remains unclear. CFTC jurisdiction seems
less likely for prediction market contracts whose payoffs do not
depend directly on the stock price.
Whatever their present legal status, corporate prediction markets
should generally not be seen as invoking the same normative concerns
77

See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 93-110 (1966).

78 See Manne, supra note 11, at 185.
79 Kee H. Cting & Charlie Charoenwong, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ash Spread,
FIN. REV., Aug. 1998, at 1, 8 (reporting the results of an empirical study confirming
that stocks with more insider trading have larger bid-ask spreads).
80 Larry Ribstein & Bruce Kobayashi, Outsider Trading as an Incentive Device, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 36 (2006).

81 See, e.g., Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 376,
383-84, 387-93 (D. Del. 2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a) (1) (2000) (providing the
complete statutory definition).
82 See Great Lakes Chem., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (citing United Hous. Found. v.
For-man, 421 U.S. 837 (1975)).
83 Id. at 384-85 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-301 (1946)).
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as insider trading regulation, at least to the same degree. To the
degree that any concern exists, it may depend on who is permitted to
trade. The argument for insider trading rules is particularly weak if
insiders are trading these contracts solely with other employees or
those in contractual privity with the firm. Prediction markets are not
used to raise capital, mitigating concerns about market integrity.
Especially when subsidized, internal prediction markets function
more as job performance inducements than as 401 (k) plans. Insider
trading in public prediction markets may raise greater concerns,
because of the increased possibility that individuals will use prediction
markets for hedging purposes rather than for betting. Even so, normative concerns seem minimal. Trading in these markets would be
purely voluntary, and anyone who wishes to avoid betting against
insiders could continue to invest in equity or traditional derivative
markets for retirement or other savings. Indeed, by bringing insider
information to the public, and by giving insiders a discrete outlet for
profit, prediction markets should make the playing field in traditional
markets even more level than before.
3.

Prediction Markets Instead of More Disclosure Regulation

Prediction markets may also have value as a substitute for (or
compliment of) existing securities disclosure requirements under federal law. Disclosure is the silver-bullet answer for nearly all corporate
law problems these days. Consider the current flap about executive
compensation made prominent by recent academic work,8 4 an endless
series of media exposes, and the options backdating scandals. While
there are many conceivable regulatory responses, ranging from nothing to tax penalties for certain types of compensation to ceilings, the
SEC's response-new disclosure rules-is hardly surprising. Ever
since President Franklin Roosevelt made Justice Louis Brandeis's slogan about sunlight being the best disinfectant the touchstone of the
securities laws,8 5 disclosure of more information to investors has been
the preferred regulatory response. After seven decades of more and
more mandatory disclosure, the costs and benefits of this regime are
unclear.
If prediction markets prove to be successful and become widespread, however, they could provide an alternative supplement, or
someday perhaps even partially displace the costly mandatory disclosure regime of the securities laws. The fundamental purpose of the
periodic disclosure requirements of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
84
85

See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
SeeJOEL SELicMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET

41-42 (3d ed. 2003).
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relevant information about
is to provide investors with equal access to
them8 6 Prediction markets forecasting stock price can by
the firm.
the
about
views
about insiders'
selves provide relevant information
can
markets
focused prediction
health of the firm as a whole. More
or issues. In theory, the
projects
provide information about particular
markets that firms must create,
SEC might someday specify certain
types prove most useful at
based on experience with which market
information. In the meantime, if
providing investors with valuable
certain types of mandatory disfirms generally develop these markets,
closure might become less necessary.
might provide alternatives
Carefully designed prediction markets
including new proposals. Conto concrete disclosure requirements,
and Robert Jackson's call for the
sider, for example, Lucian Bebchuk
8 7 Disclosure in this
pensions.
release of information on executive
of the complex nature of pension
area might be complicated, because
of some executive compensaagreements, and the contingent nature
be to use a prediction market to
tion. An alternative approach would
executives in each of a number of
forecast payments to be made to
information might be more usefuture years, apart from salary. This
participants would not need to
ful to the market, because market
about pension plans. It
engage in expensive analysis of disclosures
detailed reports, although that
also might be cheaper than producing
subsidy.
depends on the size of the market
whether prediction markets
The more speculative question is
requirements. Imagine a
might substitute for existing disclosure
of varying sizes, risks, and
hypothetical firm that has ten projects
law, the firm would likely disclose
potential returns. Under current
for each of the projects,
the existence and basic factual information
"material" changes occur. The
including periodic updates when any
run to tens, if not hundreds, of
goal of these disclosures, which often
information they need to make
pages is to provide investors with
good behavior on the
investment decisions, as well as encouraging
part of the firm by requiring disclosure.
investors actually
This regime suffers from serious problems. Few money putting
and
time
much
so
read the materials that firms spend
time
224, 234 (1988) ("We have recognized
86 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
a
substitute
to
'was
Acts,
Securities
of the various
and again, a 'fundamental purpose'
achieve
to
thus
philosophy of caveat emptor and
philosophy of full disclosure for the
SEC v. Capital
the securities industry.'" (quoting
in
a high standard of business ethics
180, 186 (1963))).
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S.
CORP. L.
J. Jackson, Executive Pensions, 30 J.
Robert
&
87 See Lucian A. Bebchuk
823, 852-53 (2005).
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together and distributing."" While average investors may free ride on
those few (professional) investors who do read the information, this
may raise normative concerns about broad and equal access to information.8 9 In addition, when deciding what to disclose, the firm must
balance a complicated tradeoff. The threat of legal liability may generally encourage more disclosure, albeit in a boilerplate fashion that is
not information-rich, while competitive pressures and the desire to
keep strategic secrets may encourage less disclosure. Faced with the
possibility of a strike suit in the event of a decline in the stock price,
firms may choose, as a pre-litigation strategy, to make voluminous but
meaningless disclosures. A firm will list so many generic risk factors
for particular projects that it will be difficult ex ante for an investor to
appreciate which factors are most significant. An additional cost of
the disclosure regime is the litigation, both meritorious and frivolous,
that results as lawyers look for material misstatements or omissions in
each descriptive disclosure.
In a world with well functioning prediction markets, the firm
might instead (or in addition) set up one or more markets for each
project. If the market were a purely internal market, the firm could
disclose the results on a periodic basis; if the market were a public
market, the disclosure would be continuous and ongoing. The ability
of the firm to disaggregate its value into discrete projects, each of
which is tracked based on a prediction market, would provide much
more information and in a more usable form than the current disclosure regime. For example, the Modigliani-Miller Theorem tells us
that investors see through the financial structure of firms to look
directly at the risk of underlying projects.9 0 In other words, a risky
project funded with equity is still risky, and a safe project funded with
debt is still safe. The idea is that investors can lever and de-lever just
as firms can, and if the market misvalues a firm based on how it is
88 Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrockers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 628, 682

(1996) ("[A]necdotal evidence, supported by many people's assumptions about
investment practices, indicates that most nonprofessional investors do not read the
prospectus and other legal disclosure documents they are given." (citing Homer
Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. tAw. 631 (1973))).
89 Regulation FD is a recent regulatory change that recognizes equal access as an
important element of securities law policy. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103 (2006). The
key provision states: "[Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, dis-

closes any material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to any
person described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the issuer shall make public
disclosure of that information . . . ." Id. § 243.100(a).
90 Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, CorporationFinance
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261, 268-69 (1958).
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undo this position.
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the
by
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costs by making project
Prediction markets help reduce the arbitrage
there is about project
risk more transparent. The less opaqueness
in financing decisions and
risk, the fewer inefficiencies that will persist
firm valuation.
alleviate many of the
In addition, this type of disclosure might
face. Firms would have less
litigation risks firms and investors now
with faulty or insufficient disincentive and ability to deceive investors
would provide a natural market
closures, as the prediction markets
would have an easy-to-undercheck. In addition, investors of all types
prospects. Moreover, firms
stand metric for evaluating the firm's
disclosures (the good from one
would no longer be able to package
in a manner that may lead to
project with the bad from another) losses. 9 2
investor
socially wasteful conduct and
their disclosures
Firms' incentives to experiment in improving
to capture any competitive
may be limited, because firms are unable
93
innovations. Once prediction
advantage from publicly disclosed
decisionmaking aids, the SEC
markets become better established as
a pilot program designed to
could, as a modest first step, sponsor
as disclosure tools. The SEC
identify best practices for using markets
a disclosure topic,
might operate the markets itself, and could choosewould be randomly
Some firms
such as executive compensation rules.
obligations, other firms to
disclosure
selected to adopt new rule-based
investors with stock-price-like
adopt a market designed to provide
practices, and still others to
measure of the firm's compensation
could be voluntary, and
adopt other market designs. Participation
could be compensated in a
firms that participate in the pilot program
use of the design for a
variety of ways, for example, through exclusive
of some other rules.
period of time or temporary relaxation
C.

Objections

to the use of prediction
There are a number of valid objections
convey information to
to
and
markets for internal decisionmaking
269

.
91 Id, at
CEO to Lie More After Dura
C. Spindler, Why Shareholders Want Their
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92 See
at 27-29), availa(forthcoming Mar. 2007)i (manuscript
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n
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m /
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cgi/viewco te .cg artcle
ble at http://law.bepre .co
have to bundle good and bad disclosures).
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(discussing the
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Speeding Up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALEJ.
93 See generally Michael Abramowicz,
to
incentive
why firms may have insufficient
RFG. 139, 153-56 (2003) (explaining
initiate governance innovations).
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markets.9 4 We consider several here: that wealth constraints may prevent employees from trading on information, that employees may be
with a firm for too short a period of time to profit from prediction
markets with long time horizons, that prediction markets may
adversely affect workplace culture, and that managers might not have

the incentives to adopt these markets because of agency costs. (We
have already considered some general objections to prediction markets, such as the danger of market inefficiency, above.95 ) We believe
each of these objections has merit, but that none is clearly fatal to
expanded use of prediction markets.
1. Wealth Constraints
One concern is that individual employees have limited liquidity,
so they may be unable to trade on information in sufficient volume to
reveal information to the market. In other words, wealthy executives
or shareholders would be able to sway the market in ways that lowerlevel employees or individual shareholders could not, even if the latter
group has more accurate information. This concern is most valid for
markets that seek to reveal information that only a very small number
of individuals might have, such as information revealing the occurrence of fraudulent activity. Admittedly, there will be some cases in
which so few people have information that the prediction market will
help, but not enough to call attention to an issue at high levels. Nonetheless, there will be many other situations in which enough people
have the correct information that they can significantly counteract
misleading statements by corporate officials. For example, many
employees in a group may recognize that their boss is unduly optimistic. Employees could also borrow (known as trading on "margin" in
94 Another possible impediment is that these markets might be illegal in some
cases or subject firms to costly disclosure requirements. As to the law, the primary
obstacles are gambling regulation and federal commodity futures trading regulation.
See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Gamblingfor the Good, Tradingfor the Future: The Legality of Markets in Science Claims, 5 CHAi. L. REv. 159, 165-72 (2002); Tom W. Bell, Prediction
Marketsfor Promotingthe Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, 14 GEo. MASON L. REv. 37,
59-91 (2006). The academic consensus is that the markets we envision in this Article
should not be illegal, especially given the important positive externalities (and lack of
negative externalities) they will have. Another issue about which some firms appear
to be concerned is how prediction markets might affect their disclosure obligations,
but we do not believe this to be a significant obstacle. Whether firms create internal
reports, hire external consultants to prepare an analysis, conduct a poll of the board

or certain employees, or use a prediction market, the end result-another input for
the decisionmaker-is the same.
95 See supra Part II.A.2.
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equity markets) from professional traders or the firm or even a bank
to finance the trade.
Moreover, in situations in which only a few employees have access
to specific information, external traders may be willing to pay these
employees for the information that they have available. This is a common practice in equity markets, and there is no reason to think that it
would not work here as well. In the famous case involving the fraud at
Equity Funding, 96 the insider who knew about the scam tipped his
friend the stockbroker, who then sold for his account and those of his
clients, thus revealing the fraud. 9 7 Moreover, one can imagine some
trading firms advertising that they will compensate employees who
present them with useful information on which to trade. Arrow's Disclosure Paradox presents a potential obstacle here; these firms might
refuse to pay for information and then trade on it anyway.98 But some
firms might acquire reputations for paying for good information and
maintaining employee anonymity, and especially when employee
information is convincing, these firms might be able to effect significant market movements. These considerations emphasize the usefulness of allowing real money markets in which third parties can
participate.
2.

Time Horizons

Employees may be hesitant to trade on prediction markets that
depend on outcomes far into the future. This will be especially true if
employees are forced to cash out their portfolios on leaving a firm.
This consideration, too, argues in favor of real money markets in
which anyone can participate. With cash markets, money invested
could be allowed to earn interest while prediction markets remain
pending, 9 9 so the time value of money should not be an inherent
problem. Even if markets are limited only to employees, however,
prediction markets can still be useful in many contexts. Those with
information implicating effects far into the future will often expect
that the market will at least partially learn this information in a shorter
time frame. An employee could thus trade on the information and
96
97
98

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Id. at 659.
KENNETH J. ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resourcesfor Invention,
in COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: PRODUCTION AND CAPITAL 104, 110-11

(1985).
99 TradeSports pays interest on some deposits. TradeSports Help Page, http://
tradesports.com/aav2/ruesAndFaqs.jsp?heipPage=banking#16 (last visited Mar. 25,
2007).
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make a profit in cashing out of the market well before the issue is
formally resolved.
3.

Workplace Culture

Prediction markets also could change firm culture in ways that
might be hard to predict. Will employees be judged on their trading
profits? Will employees who bet against the interests of their superiors be subjected to retribution? Will prediction markets undermine
vital aspects of teamwork and esprit de corps that are essential to a
well-run business? What will firms do with existing systems for budgeting, accounting, product analysis, and so on if prediction markets turn
out to be as good or better at forecasting, and would layoffs adversely
affect morale?
We do not know the answers to these questions, and we do not
expect firms or academics to answer them easily or quickly.' 0 0 Nonetheless, our preliminary hunch is that prediction markets are more
likely to improve than detract from workplace culture. '10 For many
employees, the opportunity to participate in decisionmaking should
help invest employees in the firm. (Those who do not wish to participate need not do so; different employees will make different contributions to the firm.) As all readers of the Dilbert comic know, workplace
culture is not so great already, and a recurring problem for employees
is the need to defer to superiors who may be making foolish decisions.
Increasing information transparency and improving decisionmaking
should make workplaces more pleasant, though admittedly there
might be significant transitional costs.
4. Agency Costs
Agency costs present a possible obstacle to the adoption of prediction markets. Corporate officials reasonably might conclude that
the benefits they personally will obtain from the ability to use prediction markets to assess particular questions might be smaller than the
100 There is some limited discussion of these issues, largely on blogs. See, e.g., Postings of Tyler Cowen to Marginal Revolution, http://www.marginalrevolution.com/
marginalrevoluton/2006/03/why-dont-busine.htm (Mar. 15, 2006, 07:27 EST).
101 Sociological and physiological studies find that even modest changes to work
environments can help improve productivity. Such findings, however, raise the concern that "Hawthorne effects" are present, i.e., that employees perform better simply
because observers (i.e., researchers) are present, and the changes themselves are not
driving increases in productivity. See F.J. ROETHLISBERGER &WILLIAM J. DICKSON, MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER 14-17 (1939) (finding that any changes in lighting, up to

the point where the workplace was too dimly lit for workers to see their work, produced increased productivity).
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costs. Managers may not want shareholders to be able to more easily
and more credibly propose changes in strategy; managers may not
want the power to make decisions diffused down the hierarchy; and
managers may not even want more accurate predictions for things like
sales forecasting, because overconfidence by sales managers may be a
signal of a particularly attractive trait and may encourage more work
10 2
to meet the unrealistic targets.
There is no reason, however, that shareholders cannot create
such prediction markets on their own. Even today, third parties might
create prediction markets in jurisdictions in which they are plainly
legal, such as Ireland.' 0 3 For example, lastJune financier Carl Icahn
launched a campaign to change various corporate policies at Blockbuster Inc. 10 4 It might be difficult for shareholders to determine
whether Icahn's proposed changes in fact are beneficial. And shareholders (and the board) may believe Icahn is motivated by short-term
or private value. Icahn, however, could subsidize prediction markets
predicting future stock price contingent on the corporation's future
decision to take or not take a particular step he recommends. Doing
so might help provide an objective data point to shareholders about
the advisability of his plans, and might help advance his goals in any
subsequent proxy contest.
Courts might also encourage the use of these markets, for example by taking prediction market assessments into account in assessing
whether directors should be held liable for their decisions, be it
whether to sell firm assets or how much to pay the CEO. Ajustification of the business judgment rule, which grants great deference even
to catastrophic decisions, is that the rule protects against hindsight
bias.10 5 After all, litigation results only when corporate decisions turn
102

See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74
L. REV. 1569, 1573 (2000) ("I find irresistible the inference that the overconfidence is evolutionarily adaptive.").
103 TradeSports, for example, is based in Ireland, as are TradebetX and Betdaq (a
purely sports-oriented market). See About TradeSports, http://www.tradespons.
com/aav2/aboutUs.jsp (last visited Mar. 25, 2007); Betdaq About Us, http://www.bet
daq.com/Ul/Default.aspx (follow "About Us" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 25, 2007);
TradebetX Home Page, http://www.tradebetx.com (follow "FAQs" hyperlink, then
scroll down to "Contact Us") (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). Betfair, another sports market (also known as Flutter), is based in London. See Betfair About Us, http://www.bet
fair.com (follow "About Us" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 25, 2007); see also Papers,
supra note 4 (organizing real-money and play-money prediction markets).
104 See, e.g., Shirley Won, Cost Cutting Perks up Blockbuster Story: Analysts Approve of
Company's Bid to Turn Itself Around in Tough Market, GLOBE & MAIL, June 5, 2006, at B8.
105 See, e.g., Roselink Investors, L.L.C. v. Shenkman, 386 F. Supp. 2d 209, 224
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[The business judgment rule is intended to protect directors
CHI.-KENT
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out badly, and courts are worried that judging decisions in this light
might be especially difficult given what seems like a reasonable business decision at time T might seem foolhardy at time T2. Accordingly, courts routinely defer to business judgments so long as they
were made based on a reasonable process and were not self-serving. 10 6
This stingy standard of review makes sense only if the error costs of ex
post judgments are high relative to the gains to be made from the
discipline (both general and specific) ofjudicial review. Contemporaneous predictions of the effects of corporate decisions, however, do
not suffer from the hindsight problem and therefore could be given
some role in judicial analysis.
Another reason courts engage in little ex post review of business
decisions is a concern about institutional competence. As one court
famously described the justification for the business judgment rule,
'judges are not business experts."10 7 Although this argument seems to
prove too much-courts are not medical experts either, but that does
not stop them from assessing medical malpractice claims-it is nevertheless commonly touted as a reason for deferring to well-considered
business judgments. 0 8 A related point is an evidentiary one about
private value. Litigants in business disputes often make claims about
corporate or shareholder value that courts fear are conflated with the
complaining shareholders' private value. In other words, a corporate
raider may claim that its plan is designed to increase firm value, but a
court may be concerned that the raider's motivation is to extract
rents. In complex business transactions courts may have a hard time
unpacking these, and therefore may have no choice but to defer to
the incumbent managers.
against just such attacks because their decisions are not to be second-guessed by
courts with the benefit of hindsight.").
106 Consider this recent statement of Delaware law:
Our law presumes that "in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Those
presumptions can be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the directors
breached their fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or acted in bad faith. If
that is shown, the burden then shifts to the director defendants to demonstrate that the challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.
In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2005) (quoting
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
107 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
108 See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 278 (Alaska 1980); Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 367 (Mont. 1990); Scott v. Woods,
730 P.2d 480, 488 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

1384

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:4

Prediction markets, if admissible, can help solve both of these
problems. For example, a shareholder considering a takeover battle
and expecting to challenge a firm's use of takeover defenses could
create a prediction market designed to estimate the impact of the
firm's various options on its stock price. If the market shows that the
shareholder's proposed transaction would create more value than
management's alternative plan (including takeover defenses), then
the court might admit this fact as evidence in any judicial proceeding.
We imagine that prediction markets will play no more than a minor
role in judicial decisionmaking for years after the adoption of conditional markets, but that courts increasingly might focus on them as
the technology underlying them and their reputation improves.
Finally, incentives to use these markets may come from a variety
of other sources, ranging from the SEC or the PCAOB, which could
write rules regarding their usage even before firms deploy them routinely, to corporate watchdogs or institutional investors, who set general standards for corporate best practices. The interviews we
conducted with firms and service providers in this field today suggest
that part of the caution that firms feel about deploying these markets
is regulatory uncertainty-not just whether the markets will be legal
or subject to onerous regulation, but also whether they would be valuable in meeting obligations under current law, whether it is Delaware
takeover law or Sarbanes-Oxley or Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP). A proactive approach from regulators, defining
how these markets might be used, would, we believe, be an impetus
for firms interested in doing further experiments with these markets.
5.

Sabotage

Another general concern about prediction markets is that even if
they improve decisionmaking, they might create other unfortunate
incentives. Most troublesome is the possibility of sabotage, that is, that
someone might do something bad in the real world to achieve prediction market profits. For example, a participation market participant
might set fire to a plant. These risks, however, already exist, and are
in fact greater, on public securities markets. As Robin Hanson points
out, there were some concerns that terrorists might have profited
from the September 11, 2001, attacks, although initial investigations
proved such concerns unfounded. 10 9 In theory, one could already
make a great deal of money by taking a large position shorting Gen109 This concern apparently also contributed to the demise of the terrorism prediction market proposed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA). See, e.g., Seth Grimes, Futures Shock, 6 INTELUGENT ETrRPmsr 14, 15
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eral Motors (GM) stock, and then blowing up one of its factories. Prediction markets on particular issues facing GM seem unlikely to
increase the risk of sabotage already presented by securities markets,
especially considering the stakes will be much, much smaller in the
prediction markets. The rarity of sabotage suggests that it is not anyway a big problem, perhaps because of the difficulty of accomplishing
it without being caught.
Corporate prediction markets, however, might in some cases
increase the risk of smaller acts of sabotage. Suppose, for example,
that a prediction market is forecasting a project completion date.
Someone might delay her contribution to ensure receipt of some
profit from a bet against completion. Ordinarily, such acts will be
unlikely, or at least relatively inconsequential, because there will be
generally greater incentives to be a good employee than to make some
money on a prediction market, especially if the employee's motives
could be readily discerned. Relatively high-ranking corporate employees, meanwhile, will generally have stock options and other incentives
to keep the stock price high, and these incentives will generally outweigh any incentives created by prediction markets themselves. In the
end, sabotage incentives can be controlled by limiting subsidies to a
level where the exogenous incentives provided by the markets will be
smaller than the endogenous incentives provided by the structure of
the corporation itself.
III.

IMPROVING CORPORATE DEcISIONMAING

So far we have considered using prediction markets to improve
the flow of information within a firm and from a firm to potential
providers of capital. The benefits for shareholders are the possibility
of generally reducing information costs, thus encouraging better
behavior by their agents and reducing agency costs. The use of prediction markets can also be tailored to help solve specific corporate
governance problems or reduce current costs of governance. We
assess two broad sets of corporate governance issues: first, questions of
strategy (including rule-of-the-game decisions, for example about
bylaws or about the use of prediction markets themselves), and second, questions about specific major transactions (such as takeovers).
Then, we consider the possibility that prediction markets might be
used not just to maximize shareholder welfare, but also to commit to
considering the interests of other constituencies, such as creditors and
labor. Contracts could constrain corporations to take these other
(2003) ("By supporting trading of assassination futures, is the government condoning

or even promoting illegal and immoral tactics?").
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groups into account, providing an alternative basis for mediating the
interests of different stakeholder interests.
A.

Corporate Strategy

The first potential application of prediction markets in corporate
governance is to improve shareholder consideration of certain corporate transactions. Shareholder participation in management decisions is limited, and for good reason. But shareholders do vote on
some fundamental transactions and are permitted to express their
voice on a variety of other matters. In this subpart, we consider how
prediction markets can improve the current system for shareholder
participation in firm governance, including "rules of the game" decisions such as when prediction markets should generally be deployed,
as well as how they might be used in takeovers and other voting battles. Finally, we consider how prediction markets are superior to markets for corporate votes, which are implicitly developing in many of
these areas.
1. Shareholder Proposals
The ability of shareholders directly to control corporate policy is
extraordinarily limited. Having shareholders participate in operational decisions is unnecessary (given the liquidity of capital markets
and the ability of investors to sell their shares and make other investments in case they disagree with management), would be grossly inefficient (given the heterogeneous preferences and small stakes of
investors, and their lack of information and incentive to acquire it),
and would defeat the many purposes of delegating decisionmaking in
the first place. The business judgment rule and other well-established
corporate law doctrines are manifestations of this policy choice. This
is not controversial, but beyond this, consensus among corporate
scholars breaks down. Some scholars and regulators believe that
increasing shareholder voice will improve corporate governance,
while others are comfortable with a weak shareholder model of the
public firm.
Among the former group, commentators have called for an
increased role for shareholders, especially institutional investors, in
corporate governance. Bernard Black, for one, argues that institutional investors can supplement board-based decisionmaking in governance because of the well-documented potential for abuse and
because such investors have the "incentives and competence . . .to
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address issues that are common to a number of companies."' 1 0 The
SEC's proposed (but floundering) rule that would allow shareholders
access to the proxy to nominate directors under certain circumstances
would be a relatively limited manifestation of the argument that shareholders should play a more active role in firm decisions. 1 A more
expansive approach comes from Lucian Bebchuk, who argues that
shareholders should be empowered to intervene in "rules-of-thegame" decisions, like adopting takeover defenses or the state of incorporation, 12 and in "game-ending" decisions, like mergers or asset
sales.Y1 3 Bebchuk documents potential abuses in these cases, showing
how managers can entrench themselves and how their behavior can
be self-serving and largely unchecked in final periods.
There is a rival school-call them the "traditionalists"-who
believe that the current model of strong managers, weak owners, to
use Mark Roe's phraseology,1 1 4 is the best available model." 5 Stephen Bainbridge argues that corporate law statutes manifest a strong
preference for board decisionmaking authority, noting that "managerial discretion is the default presumption" and concluding that there
is a "strong efficiency justification" for the separation of ownership
and control with a limited role for shareholder policing of director
accountability. 1 6 This view is supported by Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel's insight that corporate governance frameworks are
priced into a firm's cost of capital, giving firms incentives to choose
governance forms that maximize shareholder returns."1 7 In a series of
articles written over the past twenty-five years, corporate lawyer Martin
Lipton has defended the strong board, calling proposals to increase

110 Bernard S. Black, The Value of InstitutionalInvestor Monitoring: The EmpiricalEvidence, 39 UCLA L. REv. 895, 897 (1992).
111 Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
112 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Casefor IncreasingShareholderPower, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 844 (2005).

113 Id. at 896.
114 MARmJ. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994).
115 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist
Response to Bebchuk's Solution for Improving CorporateAmerica, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759,
1762 (2006).
116 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751 (2006).
117 FRANK H. EAsTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, TmE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 18 (1991).

-
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Skepticism about the importance and value of these proposals is
borne out by the fact that shareholders do not generally use precatory
proposals to resolve disputes about business strategy. Proposals are
used primarily for political causes, ranging from boycotting apartheid
in South Africa 122 to animal rights1 2 1 to studying universal health
insurance, 124 which are often far removed from questions of profit
maximization. These proposals rarely receive the majority of the vote
that would be necessary to win, and in any event are nothing more
than recommendations that have no binding legal effect on firms.
The average cost per firm of the precatory proposal process, including
deciding, printing, postage, and other costs, is almost $100,000 per
firm, which means U.S. firms spend over $100 million per year on
12 5
proposals that are largely meaningless in terms of firm behavior.
The costs of voting on precatory proposals thus might appear too
great to justify the benefits, at least from the perspective of the firms
themselves.
Sometimes, however, proposals important to firm governance are
offered. For example, according to data from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), there were 1042 shareholder proposals in the
26
2003 proxy season, of which about seventy-six involved poison pills.'
This is a very small number, but the governance issue is sufficiently
important that it may be enough to justify the precatory proposal
machinery. The challenge is separating the proposals that might help
solve collective action problems among diffuse shareholders (like
majority election of directors) from those that serve ends such as political activism. A relatively modest use of prediction markets might be
to use them to decide, or at least to recommend, whether shareholder
proposals should be included on a proxy statement. Many of the
bases for exclusion are designed to screen out frivolous requests,
because it may not be worth wasting the corporation's resources and
shareholders' time on proposals that are irrelevant.
122 The SEC has permitted such proposals in many cases. See, e.g., Raytheon Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act LEXIS 556 (Mar. 28, 1990); USG Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act LEXIS 450 (Mar. 12, 1990).
123 Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C. 1985) (proposing an investigation into methods of production of foie gras by a French supplier).
124 See, e.g., N.Y. City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Dole Food Co., 969 F.2d 1430, 1432
(2d Cir. 1992) (proposing a study of national health care policy).
125 Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 67 SEC Docket 373 (May 21, 1998).
126 See Stephen M. Brainbridge, A Comment on the SEC ShareholderAccess Proposal10
(UCLA Law & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 3-22, 2003), availableat http://ssrn.
com/abstract=470121.
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A simple solution would be to use conditional prediction markets
to anticipate the proportion of shareholders who would vote for a proposal if it were placed on the ballot. Participants in this prediction
market would recognize that shareholders ultimately will vote against
both proposals that they disagree with and proposals that they believe
are issues that are not appropriate for shareholder resolution. If the
threshold were set at, say, twenty-five percent, the corporation could
easily avoid proposals with little chance of passage, but managers
would not be able to exclude relatively serious ones. (At the height of
the battle over investment in South Africa, divestment proposals routinely received less than fifteen percent of the vote.) This approach
could supplant (or perhaps initially supplement) the current "noaction" letter review by the SEC.
A more ambitious use of prediction markets would be as a substitute for, or alternative to, shareholder proposals themselves, rather
than merely as a new form of gatekeeper. Assuming, as a theoretical
and practical matter that more shareholder "voice" on issues beyond
what is currently considered appropriate is, at least occasionally, beneficial, a conditional market might assess the impact on stock price of a
strategic decision or other contingency. As with existing shareholder
proposals, such prediction markets need not constrain the corporation's decisionmakers, although such markets might make managers
and directors hesitate before making value-reducing decisions (or
before foregoing value-increasing decisions).
The principal advantage of prediction markets over shareholder
voting on proposals is informational. Each shareholder has only a
limited incentive to study the relevant shareholder proposal. (In cases
in which shareholders are not anonymous, some shareholders also
may have an incentive to vote in a way that pleases the corporation's
directors.) Perhaps some large shareholders, such as institutional
shareholders, will study a question in some detail and perhaps distribute information about it to other shareholders, but because they
reap only some of the benefits from doing so, their efforts will generally be suboptimal. The incentive problem is made worse by the fact
that the proposals are not binding, thus reducing even more the
incentive to collect information.
This problem is not solved by contractual arrangements that consolidate information gathering factions in a centralized body, such as
ISS. Although specialization and economies of scale may reduce these
costs, the incentives are still not aligned, because significantly less
than all shareholders will compensate ISS for its services. A further
weakness is that the proposals and information gathered by investors
and specialists like ISS are only tenuously linked with changes in firm
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value. For example, ISS may recommend a vote for a proposal suggesting removal of a poison pill, but the argument will be a general
dislike of these provisions. ISS will not project an impact on stock
price, or support its analysis with data.
While the proffered reason for or against a particular proposal
may be couched in economic terms, the true grounds are often the
political or private interests of large pension funds or other large
shareholders, who are the primary constituents of ISS.12 7 Lipton
argues that special interest shareholders, like unions and public pension funds, pressure boards to vote the way they want "without consideration, perspective or even interest in the long-term interests of the
corporation and its shareholders as a whole."'12
The problem,
according to critics of shareholder "activism," is that shareholders with
private interests not shared by other shareholders-perhaps shortterm profit-seeking interests or political interests-couch their proposals and votes in terms of overall shareholder value, thereby deceiving the firm or other voters about the best course of action.1 29
Prediction markets, in contrast, can solve many of these
problems. Prediction markets provide a neutral, objective estimate of
the impact of the proposed strategy or action on firm value. Moreover, they solve the problem of rational ignorance. Even if only a small
number of people participate in the markets, those people will have
strong incentives to conduct research and to become informed about
the issues. Third parties, such as large shareholders or would-be
shareholders, might be permitted to propose policy directives for prediction markets to consider. An investor could detail a particular proposal, and conditional markets would predict stock price or stock
price changes at some point in the future if the proposal were
accepted or rejected. An investor also might be allowed to offer a
proposal alternative to ones already being considered (whether initiated by the managers or shareholders), resulting in the creation of an
additional prediction market.
In a recent radio commentary, Ian Ayres proposed a new mechanism for expressing shareholder voice: A certain number of shareholders would be chosen at random in a lottery (weighted by share
ownership), and this group would deliberate on a particular issue, like
127 See, e.g., Paul Rose, The CorporateGovernance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. (forthcomingJune 2007) (manuscript at 7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract902900 (arguing that "conflicts of interest within some governance firms cast doubt on the
reliability of their proxy advice and governance ratings").

128 Lipton, Twenty-Five Years, supra note 118, at 1377.
129 See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About IncreasingShareholder Power, 53 UCLA
L. Rev. 561, 593-97 (2006).
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or whether to adopt a new strathow much the CEO should be paid
to the board as the official recegy, which would then be transmitted
either before or after a
ommendation of the shareholders,
1
this proposal is innovative and
shareholder vote on the issue. 3 While
it suffers from the problems
131
somewhat related to the one we propose,
that we addressed briefly above.
decisionmaking
group
that plague
might reach a decision different
In addition, any given random group
would reach. A prediction market
from the one that most groups
be subject to these problems, and
along the same lines would not
and decisionmaking costs withwould enable firms to reduce agency
error costs.
out running the risk of increasing
these markets, and they may
Managers may be reluctant to deploy
voice precisely because it is
prefer the current regime for shareholder
are not frivolous and costly typically
broken. Shareholder actions that
a
power. Managers may not want
threaten incumbent management
proposals, because that mechamechanism that identifies frivolous
to fight the meritorious proposals.
nism may make it more difficult
parties, like investors, be able to
Accordingly, it is important that third
The SEC someday might also conpropose and deploy these markets.
markets to evaluate precatory
sider requiring firms to use these
proposals.
may help resolve the debate
Moreover, prediction markets
shareholders and those who prefer
between those who prefer strong
markets by managers, boards,
strong managers. The use of prediction
should discipline firm decisionshareholders, or other stakeholders
currently can. The current
making more efficiently than shareholders
is the takeover or proxy battle,
mechanism for shareholder discipline
are
rare that some critics believe they
both of which are sufficiently
allow
l . 132 Prediction markets, in contrast, would
generally ineffectua
credible market assessments to
shareholders a mechanism to convey
boards to sanity-check
decisionmakers, would allow underinformed to avoid making valuemanagers
managerial claims, and would allow
mere existence of prediction
the
destroying decisions. In each case,
might be sufficient to conmarkets and their potential application
these markets simultaneously
strain agent overreaching. Therefore
Democracy
Ian Ayres-How to Strengthen Shareholder
130 Marketplace: Interview with
http://marketplace.public
6, 2006), available at
(Nat'l Pub. Radio Broadcast July
radio.org/shows/2006/07/06/PM200607065.html.
131 See supra Part I1.A.2.
HARv. L. REv.
Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119
132 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk,
93 VA. L.
Franchise,
Shareholder
The Myth of the
1784, 1784 (2006); Lucian A. Bebchuk,
REV. (forthcoming May 2007).

2007]

PREDICTION

MARKETS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

1393

lower the cost of shareholder voice while making shareholder voice
less necessary.
2.

Rules of the Game

The same techniques that could be used to assess corporate strategy in general can be applied to forecast the impact of potential
changes in corporate governance. For example, a corporation considering changes to its bylaws might predict the immediate stock price
effect of an announcement of such changes. A corporation also
might use prediction markets to assess the wisdom of adopting or discarding defensive tactics even in the absence of an actual takeover
attempt. Similarly, a corporation might use a prediction market to
13 3
assess the impact of reincorporating in another jurisdiction.
Without venturing into the realm of the ridiculous, it is possible
that prediction markets might be used even to make decisions about
prediction markets' role in corporate governance. We have seen that
prediction markets might be used to determine when shareholder
proposals should be presented for shareholder votes, and also that
prediction markets might provide an alternative to such votes. Combining these ideas, prediction markets might be used to determine
when prediction markets should be used as an alternative to shareholder votes. A prediction market might be used to determine
whether to create another specific prediction market, or to determine
whether to use prediction markets in some class of situations. Moreo34
ver, prediction markets, perhaps normative prediction markets,
might be used to determine the degree to which other prediction
markets should be subsidized. Of course, corporate decisionmakers
will need to decide at least whether to create the prediction market
that makes decisions about other prediction markets, and also to
determine how much to subsidize this initial prediction market.
The recognition that prediction markets can be used to make
decisions about prediction markets suggests an answer to an objection
to the use of prediction markets for corporate governance: Even if
prediction markets are sufficiently accurate, we might not want corporations to rely on them, because sometimes it is useful for corporations to precommit to particular courses of action. Based on work by
Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott that eventually contributed to a
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, economists recognize that some133 See Roberta Romano, Competitionfor Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover
Statutes, 61 FonRAm L. REv. 843, 845 (1993) (discussing the dominance of Delaware
in the interstate competition for incorporations and reincorporations).
134 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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times institutions can maximize their welfare through precommitment. 13 5 In the corporate context, a corporation might want to
commit to maintaining a particular corporate strategy because potential suppliers, other business partners, or customers will be willing to
act in ways that will benefit the corporation only if they remain confident that the corporation will follow through on its initial plans. In
effect, a prediction market determining or recommending bylaw provisions on prediction markets is determining when it is advisable for
the corporation to precommit not to use prediction markets. Prediction markets also might be used to make other forms of precommitment. Indeed, whenever a prediction market is used to determine
whether to enact a particular bylaw or corporate charter change, the
prediction market is being used to assess the wisdom of making some
kind of precommitment.
3.

Takeovers and Other Major Corporate Transactions

One of the most debated issues in corporate law is the governance of firms that are takeover or merger targets. Prediction markets
might be useful not only as a means of making recommendations
about general policy, but also in deciding whether a corporation
should engage in particular "fundamental" transactions, such as mergers, acquisitions, or asset sales. This is an area where, for the most
part, shareholder participation-in the form of a vote-is required by
state law. For example, in the case in which one firm wants to acquire
another firm through a statutory merger, all states require the majority consent of the target firm's shareholders. 13 6
Some scholars have argued against shareholder voting mechanisms serving as the basis for determining whether a target corporation agrees to be acquired. Ronald Gilson and Alan Schwartz note
that a general problem with voting, different voters (in this case,
shareholders) having different interests in the vote, is acute in the
takeover context.137 Gilson and Schwartz distinguish "management
shareholders," specifically "members of current management and
individuals and entities who would do better if the takeover were
defeated, such as unions and, perhaps, suppliers and customers,"
from "independent shareholders," that is, "those who benefit from
135 Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85J. POL. ECON. 473, 477-80 (1977).
136 See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (c)(2001 & Supp. 2006).
137 Ronald]. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Sales and Elections as Methods for Transferring
Corporate Control, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 783, 792-93 (2001).
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their shares only as shareholders."' 13 8 Managers may be inclined to
vote against the offer, because they would lose theirjobs if their firm is
acquired. Management's assessment of the value of the firm's shares
once acquired (that is, the adequacy of the deal premium) therefore
includes private value that inures solely to the incumbent managers.
Management shareholders may be more motivated to vote, and may
seek to use the corporate information machinery to discourage others
from approving a transaction, and so voting may reject efficient
39
takeovers.1
Another problem that complicates firm voting is the heterogeneity of interests of various nonmanagement shareholders. Merger arbitrageurs typically make substantial bets on both the target and the
acquirer after a merger is announced. A frequent approach is to "lock
in the spread" by buying the target and shorting the acquirer. 140
There may be situations in which their short interests in the acquirer
will lead merger arbitrageurs to favor completion of an acquisition,
even when there might be some other potential acquirer who would
offer a more favorable deal. Potentially more troubling still is the possibility that hedge funds or other large players might enter into trans4
actions that give them large voting stakes without economic risk. 1
For example, in one recent attempted acquisition, a hedge fund with
a large stake in the target firm wanted to ensure that the deal went
through at the premium announced, even though market sentiment
quickly turned against the deal, and thus obtained votes in the
acquirer.1 42 The reverse could happen as well, with a hedge fund
acquiring votes but no economic interest in a target because of its
interest in the acquirer.
Gilson and Schwartz suggest that this heterogeneity of investor
interests means that the Delaware courts should reverse their preference for elections over markets. 43 The market mechanism that Gilson and Schwartz have in mind is the tender offer, that is, offering
138
139

Id. at 797.
Id. at 798-99.

140

For an explanation of this practice, see Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encum-

bered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 775, 810-11.
141 We consider the efficiency of markets for votes below. See infra Part III.A.4.
Our immediate concern is the danger that parties may acquire votes because of interests unrelated to any ownership interest in the firm whose votes are acquired.
142 For differing takes on the problem, compare David Skeel, Behind the Hedge,
LEGAL AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 28, 32 (describing the tactic as "rigging" and "manipulating" the deal), with Posting of Dale Oesterle to Business Law Prof Blog, http://law
professors.typepad.com/businesslaw/2005/I0/hedgefund-para.html
(Oct. 27,
2005) ("This strategy is not as dangerous as Skeel and others make it out to be.").
143 Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 137, at 789-90.
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each individual shareholder the opportunity to sell shares separately
from the collective decision.14 4 The literature has demonstrated, however, some problems associated with tender offers. In some cases, a
14 5
rational shareholder who wants a bid to succeed might not tender,
but in other cases, a rational shareholder who wants a bid to fail might
46
tender anyway.1
Some proposed reforms may improve results, but voting regimes
have systematic problems that likely cannot be solved. Lucian
Bebchuk and Oliver Hart point out that shareholder voting on specific acquisitions will work well when an affirmative shareholder vote is
1 47
a necessary and sufficient condition for the acquisition to occur.
They do not, however, directly confront the arguments of Gilson and
Schwartz about the propensity of different shareholders to vote. 148
Paul Edelman and Randall Thomas take what they describe as an
"intermediate position,"1 49 concluding that "shareholders should be
able to vote to remove any defensive tactic that is interfering with the
right to sell or vote their stock,"' 50 but that the target's board be
allowed to delay such votes for a limited period of time, no greater
than thirteen months. 15 1 Such delays may be less than ideal, and the
proposal still depends on shareholders having sufficient knowledge to
make informed decisions about whether to remove defensive tactics.
An alternative approach would be to use prediction markets to
predict the value of the proposed transaction for the target, allowing
each shareholder to receive an assessment of the value that is not
biased by private values, short-term liquidity positions, or undisclosed
interests that may conflict with the valuation assessment. For example, a conditional market could assess the value of any consideration
received for the target's shares at some point in the future after consummation of the transaction being considered. Although this is
ostensibly what the public stock price is designed to measure, the
144 Id. at 792-94.
145 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-RiderProblem,
and the Theory of the Corporation, 1 BELLJ. ECON. 42, 44 (1980).
146 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1693, 1719 (1985).
147 See Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for
Corporate Control 22 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Harvard Law Sch.,
Discussion Paper No. 336, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-292883.
148 Bebchuk and Hart note in a footnote simply that the Gilson and Schwartz
model and others "focused on issues other than the ones we analyze." id. at 3 n.2.
149 See Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Voting and the Takeover
Debate, 58 VAND. L. REV. 453, 486-87 (2005).
150 Id.
151
Id.
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in
cause distortions in this valuation
shortcomings outlined above may
information
and
the general noise
these special cases, as well as
above. Bebchuk and Hart worry
problems in stock prices identified
uninformed individuals to determine
that it is difficult for relatively
to accept takeover bids, because
from stock prices alone whether
is, they reflect not only any benefit
those prices are endogenous; that
assessment of the probability
of the transaction, but also the1market's
52
occur.
that the transaction will
could solve the long-standing
In theory, prediction markets
the duties of the board in fundadebate about defensive tactics and
Using prediction markets to predict
mental corporate transactions.
that each shareholder will receive
the value, other than private value,
has at least some advantages over
if an acquisition is or is not accepted
shareholder vote, there is no danger
alternative approaches. Unlike a
will lead to an embrace of ineffithat different intensity of preference
time, participants in the prediction
cient transactions. At the same
decisions about whether to
market would not be making individual
markets would not present any
tender securities, and so prediction
decision might conflict with the
conflict in which an individual tender
in the prediction market would
individual's preferences. Participants
the
if a particular bid were denied,
have incentives to consider that
offer a higher bid.
bidder or some third party might
are particularly useful because
Markets in the takeover context
shareactors to act in the interest of
they help constrain corporate
for the general reason identified
holders. But markets are also useful
costs and distortions of information
in Part II, that they reduce the
better access to valuable
flows within a firm, allowing decisionmakers
reasoned and fully informed decisions.
information necessary to make
as
to the merger transaction process
Commentators frequently point
has
governance. The CEO of a firm
evidence of broken corporate
must
board
The
with a competitor.
proposed to the board a merger
The
merger and on what terms.
decide whether to approve the
day-toof part-time employees without
board, however, is composed
except through the CEO.
day experience or access to information
as to avoid or
. . merger in a way so
The CEO "can thus present a.
153 Recognizing this
evaluation of it."
undermine any board critical
true value of the merger, and recoglimit on their ability to gauge the
selfreaction includes the noise of
nizing that the public market's
as
takers
profit
and
speculators,
interested arbitrageurs, short sellers,
152
153

5.
Bebchuk & Hart, supra note 147, at
GovMomentum: Reforming Corporate Law
Merger
the
Breaking
Fanto,
A.
See James

REv. 249, 293 (2001).
erning Mega-Mergers, 49 Burr. L.
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equity, the board could conwell as long-term holders of the firm's
its informational decision more
struct a prediction market to process
effectively.
the problems that nonexpert
These markets might also overcome
When courts engage in valuacourts have in performing valuation.
appraisal proceeding or a
tion analysis today, whether in a postmerger
decision is based primarily on
bankruptcy proceeding, the valuation
This approach has serious limithe court's view on a battle of experts.
can be highly technical, biased by
tations, since these presentations
the decision in question, and
events or information revealed after
that may be hard to disaggregate.
include private value considerations
markets established by others.
Instead, courts could rely on prediction
on a prediction market that would
For example, a court could rely
shareholder's shares during the
estimate the value of a dissenting
precourts someday might establish
appraisal process. Conceivably,
northe
use
for example, could
diction markets themselves. A court,
would
above, in which the market
mative market approach discussed
neutral party would choose. In the
estimate the valuation that some
to present prediction market
shorter term, courts might allow litigants
weight on the results if the markets
results as evidence and place great
have been designed properly.
of prediction markets would
One specific valuation application
bankruptcy. In a recent article,
be to help reduce uncertainty in
argue that expected variance in
Douglas Baird and Donald Bernstein
from the absolute priority
valuation results in observed deviations market transaction, so it is
is no
rule.15 4 In traditional valuation, there
how senior and junior
"the bankruptcy judge's perspective-and
155 The uncertainty of the judicial
investors perceive it-that counts."
value"' 5 6 for various junior claimvaluation process "generates option
to compensate them for that,
ants, and senior claimants are willing
"share the same view of the business's
even in cases in which all parties
solutions
157 Baird and Bernstein propose several possible
prospects."
including court-appointed
to the problem of valuation uncertainty, encourage parties to subthat
changes
experts and various procedural
1 5 8 A prediction market forecasting the
mit nonextreme valuations.
would provide an objective, marestimate of a court-appointed expert
reduce valuation uncertainty. Even
ket-based assessment that could
Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty,
154 Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein,
1937-44 (2006).
1930,
L.J.
YALE
115
and the Reorganization Bargain,
155 Id. at 1943.
156 Id. at 1959.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1969.
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absent judicial reliance on this prediction market, creditors or creditor tranches might independently use these markets to estimate firm
value.'15 9 These markets at least could reduce the possibility that parties would have different assessments of the outcome of litigation,
reducing the need for litigation to occur.
Two additional uses of prediction markets along the same lines
are worth briefly considering. The first is in freezeout transactions
where valuation problems may allow value-destroying transactions to
proceed and may prevent value-creating transactions from occurring.
Under state law, owners of a certain percentage of a firm's stock (typically ninety percent) can cash out the minority shareholders through
a statutory short-form merger that does not require a shareholder
vote. 160 The danger is that majority shareholders may abuse this
power and their informational advantage to cash out minority shareholders at prices that undervalue their shares.
The Delaware courts' solution to this potential for abuse is an ex
post judicial valuation proceeding in which the majority shareholders
must show that the transaction is "entirely fair," which includes both
procedural fairness (usually through a "special committee" of socalled "independent directors") and price fairness. 16 1 There are at
least two problems with this approach. First, courts, even the specialty
Delaware courts, may have difficulty accurately determining a fair
value for shares given the informational asymmetries and their own
institutional competence. Second, firms are, after the recent decision
in In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation,162 deploying a new technique-tender-offer freezeouts-to avoid entire fairness review
altogether.1 63
The most commonly articulated solution is primarily a procedural one that tries to replicate an arm's-length transaction-a review by
a disinterested special committee of directors followed by a vote of the
minority shareholders. I64 As described above, there are obvious
problems with voting in such cases, and minority shareholders may
still have less than the best available information about the value of
their shares. A prediction market could be used to value these shares
159

Baird and Bernstein suggest the possibility of market-oriented mechanisms to

reduce valuation uncertainty. See id. at 1963-65.
160 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2001).
161 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994) (holding that the judicial standard for evaluating cash-out merger by dominating shareholder is "entire fairness").

162
163
164

No. CIV-A-18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001).
See Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 19 (2005).
Id.
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more easily. This technique could be deployed by acquiring firms,
target firms, majority shareholders, minority shareholders, or perhaps
even the courts.
A second additional potential use would be for estimating the
value of private firms. Many legal disputes in closely held corporations and other private business forms arise because valuations are difficult in the absence of a market for the firm's securities. Private
equity firms that specialize in valuing these firms rely on costly due
diligence reviews and expert analysis, and ultimately rely on a comparison with prior deals with similar firms or with public firms. The costs
and uncertainty of accomplishing valuation through litigations inhibit
efficient ex ante contracting and capital raising. Firm stakeholders
are subject to abuse by controlling shareholders in the absence of an
easy way to exit the firm with some reasonable certainty about getting
fair value for their stake. Prediction markets may help alleviate these
uncertainties in the same way that they do for public firms. Indeed, a
firm that recently formed intends to provide market-oriented valuations for private firms. 165
4.

Prediction Markets Instead of Markets for Votes

Both of these potential applications of prediction markets-for
shareholder voice and for takeovers-resemble a market for votes, in
which shareholders (or even third parties) can participate in corporate decisionmaking through borrowing or buying share voting rights,
166
with the economic rights either decoupled from or hedged away.
Some commentators believe that we are moving toward, if not already
in, a world in which vote buying (through borrowing and other
means) is common, especially for contentious issues. 16 7 For example,
in a recent survey of vote borrowing and buying, Henry Hu and Bernard Black conclude that the practice of voting shares not "owned"
and voting shares with no economic interest is widespread, and that
"[c]leverness in vote buying.

.

.

may well become important for suc-

cess" in takeovers and other corporate governance matters. 168 An
empirical study by several finance scholars supports this claim, finding
that share borrowing increases significantly immediately preceding

165 See Numeria Home Page, http://nuneria.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
166 See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 140, at 804-09.
167 See, e.g., id.; see also Susan E.X. Christoffersen et al., Vote Trading and Information Aggregation 31-33 (ECGI-Finance, Working Paper No, 141/2007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=686026).
168 Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard S. Black, Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 Bus. LAW 1011, 1026 (2006).
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vote of a
"record-dates," that is the date on which "ownership" of the
169
particular share is determined.
may be superior to any
The prediction markets described above
of the biggest complaints about
conceivable market for votes. One
to
votes is the lack of transparency
the shadow market for corporate
official
public. A more open and
other voters, to the firm, and to the
a market price was established
market for corporate votes, in which
solve that problem, however.
for the votes of individual shares, could
on this issue. Saul Levmore
The scholarly consensus is still developing
a significant problem with a market
identifies a paradox that presents
of a
is worth very little while the value
for votes: The value of any share
170 Accordingly, individuals entitled to
large block of shares is high.
are likely to sell their votes "at
vote (say through share ownership)
out
'1 71 absent a way of coordinating because if they hold
172 There
trivial prices"
sell for a nonzero amount.
there are many others willing to
votes at more attractive prices at
is no guarantee that anyone will buy
someone will be willing to buy votes
any point in the future, because
obtain a majority. Each individual
only so long as it is possible to
to sell voting rights to someone
shareholder may have an incentive
to use those voting rights in a
who has a private economic incentive
collective economic interests.
way that will harm the shareholders'
among buyers [may]
Levmore concludes that "competition
cheaply because of their collective
allay[ I] sellers' fears of selling too
73 especially in the corporate law context where
action problem,"'
some protections against these
mechanisms like the tender offer allow
that
7 4 Richard Hasen is even more bullish, concluding
problems.'
and would not increase agency
corporate vote buying is efficient
collective
175 Even if these commentators are correct that
problems.
regrequire
however, the fix might
action problems can be overcome,
probe
"early sellers [might need to]
ulation. Levmore argues 1that
76 While it may be possible to solve this
tected . . . if prices rise.
or statute or judicial review, as
problem through charter amendment
169

Ownership 7
et al., The Market for Record-Date
See Susan E. K Christoffersen
http://ssrn.com/abstract-at
manuscript), available

(July 4, 2002)
302522.
170

171
172
173
174

(unpublished

(2000).
53 STAN. L. REv. 111, 123-41
Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity,

Id. at 123.
Id. at 121-41.
Id. at 139.
Id.

175

88 CAL. L. REv. 1323, 1370 (2000).
Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying,

176

Levmore, supra note 170, at 139.
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Levmore suggests, each of these mechanisms has the potential to be
quite costly.
Prediction markets can avoid many of these issues, achieving the
same goals with little additional costs. In a prediction market, no individual shareholder is forced to make an early decision about whether
to sell, and the danger that someone might seek to buy up votes to
advance private interests, not to the benefit of shareholders generally,
is altogether avoided. The prediction market will update continuously until the market closes, not only relieving the pressure on individual choice, but also embedding more information into the price
through continuous participation. Vote buying markets, in contrast,
are able to capture less information because early sales, which by definition are based on incomplete information, freeze some percentage
of the vote in an informationally stale state. The prediction market
can avoid ex post litigation over the sale of early votes, but also capture all information between the time the market is announced and
its close, as opposed to a decreasing percentage of available
information.
A final benefit of prediction markets is that there is less potential
for manipulation. The concerns above about transparency (Hu &
Black) 1 7 7 and early sellers (Levmore) 1 7s hint at the possibility that
sophisticated investors and corporate raiders or activists may be able
to structure offers or arrange transactions that effectively disenfranchise shareholders or buy their votes at significantly reduced
prices. While Levmore is right that regulation (both ex ante and ex
post) can prevent some manipulation, it may be under- or overinclusive and will be costly in any event.
B.

Personnel

1. Board Member Selection
A corporate law issue of perennial and especially contemporary
concern is who should nominate directors, how long they should
serve, and what percentage of votes is needed to win a director election. In the ongoing battle over who has power in firms-shareholders or managers-these issues take center stage. This is because
defenders of the status quo of manager power point to board elections, either regularly or in proxy fights, as providing managers with
disciplinary oversight. The Delaware courts have proclaimed: "The
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the
177
178

See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
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legitimacy of directorial power rests."'

9

14o3

Critics view the elections, in

which directors are nominated solely by management and need only a
plurality of votes to win, as ineffective to constrain managers.18
The battle over director elections is currently being waged on two
fronts: in the SEC, through a proposal to allow shareholders to nominate one or two rival directors for inclusion on the firm's proxy under
certain circumstances,' 8 1 and in the increasingly popular precatory
proposals calling for amendments to firms' bylaws requiring directors
to win a majority of votes for election.18 2 Both of these approaches
could be improved through prediction markets technology. Markets
could be used at a minimum to evaluate the merits of the precatory
proposals and to determine whether to allow rival directors proposed
by shareholders on the ballot.
Just as conditional markets can be used to assess shareholder proposals and inform shareholders about their likely effects on stock
prices, so too could conditional markets be used to inform shareholders about the consequence of electing different directors. A corporation, for example, might establish a policy of using conditional
markets to assess the stock price effects of elections of particular directors and to include this information on the proxy sent to shareholders. The corporations most likely to do this would be those confident
that the official management recommendations in fact will be viewed
by the prediction market as best for shareholders, but if the approach
proves successful, shareholders might press other corporations to follow suit. Because the effect of the election of a single director may in
some cases be small, the conditional markets should probably predict
the immediate effect on stock prices of the announcement of the
director or, more likely, a slate of directors, rather than the long-term
impact of the selection. 8 3
These markets will likely prove most valuable in cases in which
there is an open conflict between management and shareholders over
the board, and where the addition of one or a few board members is a
179 Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. 1988).
180 See Bebchuk, supra note 112, at 851-56.
181 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for ShareholderAccess to the Ballot, 59 Bus.
LAw. 43, 47 & n.12 (2003) (commenting on Security Holder Director Nominations,
68 Fed. Reg. 60, 784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
249, 274)).
182 See Institutional Shareholder Services, ISS Announces New Policy on Majority

Voting,

http://wwwissproxy.com/governance/publications/2005archived/037.jsp

(last visited Mar. 25, 2007) (noting that eighty such proposals were made in the first

six months of the proxy season, and announcing support for these proposals).
183 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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firm. The recent battle at
sign of a broader shift in power within the
CEO Michael Eisner and dissident
the Walt Disney Company between
of a case in which the impact
shareholders provides a good example
be measured. In effect, the quesof a single director's election could
was how much power the CEO
tion before Disney shareholders
of
and the outcome of the election
should have vis-A-vis the board,
firm's
the
a significant impact on
directors seemed likely to have
future. 184
2.

Manager Hiring and Firing

less useful in the selection
Prediction markets may be somewhat
selection of directors. Hiring pracof managers compared with the
are typically shrouded in confitices for senior management positions
other firms do not want their
dentiality. CEO candidates from
and internal candidates too might
potential interest publicly known,
there is a risk that it will be known
be less willing to be considered if
particular positions. This does not
that they sought and were refused
have no role in the process. Where
mean that prediction markets can
speculated about, a corporation
specific candidates have been widely
might use prediction markets
(or a group of interested shareholders)
might imagine a nonprofit,
to make an assessment. Similarly, one
to assess which potenmarket
such as a university, using a prediction
in increasing the institution's
tial president will have the most success
endowment or ranking.
market with participaA corporation also might run a prediction
committee or search firm, to
tion limited to members of a search
firm in fact recommends the canimprove the chance that the search
believe most likely to increase
didate that members of the committee
can be designed to give small
shareholder welfare. Prediction markets
to share their reasons for particular
numbers of individuals incentives
as the locus of small group delibpositions, and so a market can serve
might be used to select among
eration. 1 5 Prediction markets also
possible search firms or search committees.
markets may be more useful
We believe, however, that prediction
voluntary or involuntary, of
for assessing the impact of the 18departure,
6 In this case, the identity of the relean executive, such as the CEO.
so there is no difficulty associated
vant official is already obvious, and
C4.
CEO, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at
CalPERS Won't Vote in Favor of Disney
41, at 938-39.
185 See Abramowicz, supra note
of using
Hanson has explored the possibility
Robin
186 In an unpublished work,
to Step
CEOs
Telling
for
Markets
Robin Hanson,
prediction markets in this way.
at http://hanson.gmu.edu/dumpceo.html.
Down, (April 26, 1996), available
184
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with secrecy. The magnitude of the impact is also potentially very
large, based on recent high-profile CEO departures. 18 7 The problem
for firms, which prediction markets can solve, is that this impact was
seen only after the decision was announced. While a firm may have
had some information, based say on interviews with investment bankers or analysts, that the stock price would increase after the decision,
prediction markets would provide a powerful tool that would increase,
on the margin, the number of cases in which firms could make a
value-increasing decision about which manager to run the firm.
Such markets in effect would provide a real-time continuous measurement of the market's assessment of the expected future performance of a particular official. While the general stock price measure of
a firm may help discipline CEO actions, making officials less likely to
make value-decreasing decisions, prediction markets focused directly
on the CEO could be considerably more powerful. Such markets
would assess the degree to which a corporation's future anticipated
success is dependent on a particular official. Even the CEO of a corporation that happens to be successful for reasons having little to do
with the CEO would have to strive to establish personal value. We
recognize, of course, that few CEOs will decide to implement such
markets, and, as with many of this Article's proposals, such markets
may be feasible only in the long run, if prediction markets gather sufficient momentum. Once again, however, shareholders or outsiders
interested in the corporation's performance themselves might establish this type of prediction market.
As in the case of director elections, the cases in which such markets may be most useful are the extreme cases in which a power struggle within a firm is open and notorious. The recent battle at Disney is
again informative. The struggle for control of Disney was effectively a
referendum on the leadership of CEO Eisner. Dissident directors and
shareholders waged a multi-part campaign to oust Eisner, including
precatory proposali on board elections, a proxy fight, a public relations campaign, and several shareholder derivative suits alleging Eisner and his cronies were paid excessive and wasteful compensation.
The battle was long, expensive, and, most important, based on little
more than speculation about Eisner's value and what impact his
departure would have. A prediction market might be able to shortcircuit much of this by trying to get a consensus answer to that specific
question.
187 Matt Krantz, Ousting CEOs Often Boosts Stock Price,USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 2005, at
I B (noting that stocks rally 3.5 percent, on average, when underperforming CEOs are
forced out).
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Executive and Board Compensation

There is a natural transition from discussions of CEO value to
questions about compensation, since the two theoretically should be
related. The simplest use here could be simply as a means of aggregating information about compensation levels and practices to the
market. Much of the academic and media criticism is aimed at the
ability of executives, through convoluted pay packages, to conceal the
true amounts of compensation. 18 A market that estimates the total
value to an executive, and therefore the total cost to the firm, would
solve this problem. The value of many elements of an executive's
compensation-like options-are highly uncertain. The best available tools, like the Black-Scholes formula for valuing options, are of
questionable accuracy and are difficult to apply in practice, even when
the details of compensation are disclosed.18 9 A simple prediction
market approach might predict the value that an analyst chosen at
random would assign to a pay package.
More ambitiously, prediction market assessing the stock market
implications of a particular executive's departure itself provides a
baseline for assessing that executive's compensation. At least, it would
seem that corporations generally should not pay executives more than
their value to the corporation, unless the corporation has precommitted to doing so. Conditional prediction markets provide a way of measuring the value of executives relative to the next best alternatives.
This may be valuable in deciding how much to pay particular executives. For example, if a prediction market estimates that the stock
price would increase upon an executive's departure, it would suggest
that the executive was overpaid. If, on the other hand, the market
predicts a stock price decrease upon an executive's departure, it suggests that the executive is not overpaid.
Prediction markets also might be used to assess the possibility of
making discrete changes in compensation packages, for particular
employees. For example, a corporation might use a conditional prediction market to assess the impact on stock price of different possible
changes to compensation, including different levels of decreases and
raises and different baskets of cash, stock options, and perks. 19 0 Such
188 See, e.g., LuciAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WiTtouT PERYORMANcE 67-70
(2004); Gretchen Morgenson, Executive Pay, HidingBehind Small Print,N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
8, 2004, § 3, at 1.
189 See, e.g., Craig Schneider, ForgetBlack-Scholes?: Why the TraditionalOption-Pricing
Model May Not Be the Best Way to Value Employee Grants, CFO MAG., May 2004, at 45.
190 See generally M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A
Defense of Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, 93 GEO. L.J. 1835,
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compensation increases the
markets would factor in that higher
particular
will be able to retain the
probability that the corporation
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someone's salary would indicate
poration would be best off docking
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would be worth any increased
the door or that the financial savings
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because such options will protop officials in part with stock options
an
But this is an imperfect device, as
duce desirable incentive effects.
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19 3 Although
increase in a corporation's stock price
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table to any particular director or
for this by basing compensasome stock option plans seek to control
relative to its competitors,
tion on the performance of a corporation firm-specific performance
of
portion
this too is imperfect. Even some
than CEO performance; perhaps
may be attributable to factors other
in stumbling into a lucrative busia firm simply happened to be lucky
to contract specifically to base
ness. An alternative is for a firm
of the CEO's value, for
bonuses on prediction market assessments the stock price effect of
of
example based on conditional predictions
the CEO's possible departure.
perks
may be optimal for firms to give executives
1863-67 (2005) (explaining why it
rather than just cash).
191 Id. at 1842.
Morgennote 188, at 37-39; see also Gretchen
192 See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra
2006, at
10,
Apr.
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N.Y.
Independent,
So
Not Be
son, Outside Advice on Boss's Pay May
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is
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Econ., Unv. Pa. Law Sch., Paper No.
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223
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available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=622
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Without
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for
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These markets are, for the theoretical and practical reasons cited
above, likely to be superior to various reform measures proposed to
address alleged problems in how executives are paid. In Pay Without
Performance, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried claim that high agency
costs allow managers (who have the power and the incentives to care
about compensation) to extract more than the optimal amount from
shareholders. 194 They propose various governance reforms-such as
shareholder access to the proxy, increased independence of boards,
and so on-as mechanisms for constraining managerial power and
overreaching. 9 5 More moderately, Jeffrey Gordon proposes requiring firms to disclose more detail about their pay philosophy and
approach in a narrative in firms' disclosure documents-to be called
"Compensation Discussion and Analysis." 196 Both proposals seek to
reduce agency costs by increasing shareholder power, either through
monitoring and governance roles or through increased information
provision. Others have argued, however, that shifting the balance of
power within firms from managers to shareholders will impose large
costs, while providing only speculative benefits from reduced compensation. 19 7 Disclosure requirements are also costly, and have been
shown in the compensation area to be fraught with unintended consequences. 98 Prediction markets, on the other hand, can help reduce
agency costs, without these potentially costly changes to corporate
governance.
Prediction markets have the potential not only to create new procedures for determining salaries, but also for lowering the amounts
that top managers are paid. The current model of executive compensation rewards top managers richly based on the assumption that it is
their decisionmaking skills that create or destroy shareholder value. A
greater role in firm decisionmaking for prediction markets will necessarily require a reassessment of the compensation scheme and what is
needed to attract, motivate, and retain top managers. As decisionmaking becomes more diffuse, one might expect the pay of managers
to decrease, as their role becomes, on the margin, less important.
In the extreme case, where these markets are so effective that
they are contractually or legally delegated as the decisionmaker, the
194 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 188, at 15-17.
195 Id. at 201-16.
196 SeeJeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation:If There's a Problem, What's the Remedy ? The Casefor "CompensationDiscussion and Analysis, "30 J. Con. L,675, 695 (2005).
197 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 116, at 1751.

198

For a discussion of the pros and cons of disclosure, see Edward M. lacobucci,

The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 48 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 489, 497-503

(1998).
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manager's role, and hence compensation, should look substantially
different from today. For example, fewer options or other contingent
compensation may be needed, since decisionmaking incentives are
less important; this might have the impact of dramatically reducing
total compensation, since the bulk of CEO pay, and nearly all of the
growth in pay over the past several decades, is based on incentive compensation. Indeed, fewer managers may be needed, if many decisions
are delegated to prediction markets. In effect, managerial skills can
be outsourced through prediction markets, instead of obtained only
through employment relationships.
The skills valued in top managers may evolve in ways that are difficult to predict. For example, future managers may spend more time
managing these markets and their impact on a firm, both internally
and externally. Not only may these markets fundamentally change
how individual employers do their work and are motivated, but they
have the potential to create rivalries or be destructive to teamwork
and morale. Managers, meanwhile, will still have to figure out how to
implement the recommendations of the markets. Much of the work
of executives is not knowing what to do, but doing it-that is, mustering the internal will and playing the right internal political cards to
make sure the policy is well executed. These essential traits of today's
managers will still be required, and insofar as today's compensation
schemes are about execution, we should expect less change.
C.

Creditors and Other Nonshareholder Constituencies

So far, we have assumed that firms would use prediction markets
to maximize stock price, to the benefit of the firm's equity holders.
But it also might be possible for prediction markets to forecast effects
on other capital providers, like creditors, and even other stakeholders,
like, most importantly, labor. We will bracket the normative question
of if and how much firms should take the views of other firm constituencies into account in decisionmaking, and focus for now on how
these various constituencies can most efficiently be included in corporate decisionmaking. Prediction markets could be useful in two ways.
First, they could enhance monitoring of the firm's activities by one or
more of these groups. Second, they could facilitate contracting
between shareholders and these other constituencies, allowing the
firm to commit to taking their interests into account, at least to some
degree, in making decisions.
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Creditors

The potential for prediction markets to reduce agency costs
applies not just for shareholders but creditors as well. When firms
finance projects partially with debt, such as bonds and loans, a potential for conflict arises between lenders on one hand and managers and
shareholders on the other. Actions that may increase the value of
shares-like investments in risky projects and payment of dividendswill decrease the value of the firm's debt. Shareholders, generally
including managers, may therefore prefer some risks that decrease
overall corporate value, including the value of both equity and debt.
Shareholders receive more of the upside from such actions than they
bear of the downside. The potential losses from such actions and the
costs that lenders and borrowers expend to reduce these risks are
known as the agency costs of debt.19 9
Lenders use contractual provisions, known as covenants, to try to
reduce these costs. Covenants, which can run to hundreds of pages,
routinely limit dividend payments, restrict the ability of a firm to take
on additional debt, and give lenders access to firm information that
allows them to prevent the firm from taking actions that would
prejudice creditors in favor of shareholders. 20 0 The benefit of covenants is that they can reduce shareholder opportunism, lowering the
agency costs of debt for lenders. That in turn allows the firm to lower
its cost of capital. Covenants, however, are an imperfect oversight
device. They entail large monitoring and enforcement costs, and they
can prevent actions that can increase overall corporate value, that is,
increase the value of equity more than the decrease in the value of
debt.2H Covenants are costly because they can be over- or underinclusive, and in any event, require lenders to collect, process, and interpret incomplete data from the borrower. 20 2 Covenants are costly even
for good quality borrowers, who, in an attempt to differentiate themselves from poor quality borrowers, will expend resources on aggregating data and persuading lenders about their compliance.
199
200

SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 49, at 333-37.
Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92
YALE L.J. 49, 66-67 (1982).
201 Id.
202 Agency costs of debt are potentially exacerbated by tne recent growth in the
credit derivatives market, which allows lenders to sell the risk of particular loans to
third parties, such as hedge funds. As debt begins to look more diffuse, like equity,
lenders have less incentive to employ costly monitoring mechanisms. See Frank
Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 76 U. CIN. L.
REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2007) (manuscript at 17-20).
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The proposed academic solutions to these problems are, like
those proposed for shareholder agency costs mentioned above, largely
organizational in nature. For example, with respect to public bonds,
Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade, and Marcel Kahan propose the creation of a "supertrustee" that has the power to "actively monitor, renegotiate, and enforce bond covenants" 2013 and that is paid pursuant to
an "incentive-based compensation scheme." 20 4 As for bank debt,
scholars argue that banks should be limited in the types of services
they can offer lenders (to reduce potential conflicts of interest) and
should be prohibited from transferring the credit risk of their loans to
third parties, such as hedge funds (to maintain their incentive to
monitor).205

Prediction markets can help both lenders and borrowers reduce
the agency costs of debt by providing a complement to, or perhaps
even a substitute for, loan and bond covenants. There are three
increasingly ambitious possibilities. First, prediction markets can help
lenders monitor, and borrowers signal compliance with, existing loan
covenants. For example, corporate loan agreements typically include
"state-of-the-firm" covenants that require borrowers to maintain certain accounting and financial ratios, such as minimum net working
capital or specific ratios of debt to assets. Borrowers therefore compile data on all of these metrics and report them to lenders. This
system entails the same collection and verification problems that we
saw above with other types of internal and external financial reporting. To reduce error costs and the potential for manipulation, the
borrower or lender could separately or together create prediction
markets that estimate the specific figures or, more simply, the likelihood of the borrower's compliance with the covenants. Even with significant subsidies, which might be needed to give participants
incentives to do research, these markets are likely to be a much less
costly mechanism for covenant monitoring.
The second possibility is that prediction markets could displace
the use of covenants all together. After all, the set covenants in a particular loan agreement is nothing more than a proxy for the question
the bank really cares about-will the bank get its money back?-and
there is no reason that prediction markets cannot be used to give an
estimate of this question. So instead of borrower and lender expending resources contracting over and monitoring covenants, they could
203 Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance Structurefor CorporateBonds, 51 STAN. L.
REv. 447, 451 (1999).

204

Id.

205

See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 202 (manuscript at 17-20).
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design that would estimate the
instead agree on a prediction market
comply with the terms of the loan
probability that the borrower would
will get its money back. We can
agreement-that is, that the bank
markets permitting lendimagine loan agreements that use prediction
in the management of the firm
ers an increasing level of involvement
various probabilities of default.
after the prediction market crossed
market estimates a twenty-five perFor example, when the prediction
get authority for an inspection
cent chance of default, the lender may
to limit the firm from taking on
of financial records and the right
reaches fifty percent, the lender
additional debt; when the estimate
the debt, take a board seat, or
may get authority to restructure
and so on.
demand approval over major expenditures;
would be to permit firms to
A final use of prediction markets
of lenders when evaluating promore efficiently consider the interests
corporate decisions. This
ject choice or making other important
to take into account the interest
would allow borrowers to precommit
thereby enabling firms to lower
of creditors in their decisionmaking,
current law, there is currently an
their overall cost of capital. Under
how firms have an obligation to
unresolved debate about if, when, and
in corporate decisionmaktake the interests of creditors into account
"zone of insolvency"-some courts
ing. At one extreme-firms in the
joint interests of shareholders
20 6 At all
find a firm obligation to consider the
trustees for creditors.
facto
de
as
act
to
even
or
and creditors
are protected primarily through
20 7
times before then, creditor interests
described above.
mechanisms
monitoring
the contractual and
when the debt agreement is
Deploying prediction markets (either
reached) to estimate overall corsigned or after some milestones are
creditors, would enable firms to
porate value or specific value for
terms to limit their own
credibly precommit with simple contract
risk for lenders.
actions in ways that will lower the
2.

Labor

to a firm's other imporSimilar benefits are possible with regard
law theorists have argued
tant constituencies as well. Some corporate
be viewed as an implicit contract
that the board of directors should
737512 (2d
Chem. Corp., No. 95-7554, 1995 WL
206 See, e.g., Geren v. Quantum
become
may
corporation
a
of
York law, directors
Cir. Dec. 13, 1995) ("Under New
Recovery,
Jewel
also
see
when the corporation is insolvent.");

trustees of the creditors
N.D. Tex. 1996) ("Delaware law recognizes
L.P. v. Gordon, 196 B.R. 348, 354 (Bankr.
the assets of the corporation become a
that when a corporation becomes insolvent,
creditors.").
trust for the benefit of the corporation's
text.
accompanying
and
202-06
notes
207 See supra
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among a corporation's various constituencies. 208 On this theory, the
board's virtue is not that it will maximize shareholder wealth at every
turn, but that it will mediate among constituencies. The board's facilitation of "team production" in the long run is to the shareholders'
advantage, because the creation of the board allows shareholders to
commit to constituencies such as labor that the shareholders will not
take advantage of them later. For example, a board may be unlikely
to effect a broad layoff when doing so would increase profitability only
slightly. Such a commitment makes it easier for a firm to recruit workers, thus increasing shareholder welfare ex ante even if it prevents
shareholder wealth maximization ex post.
Prediction markets can facilitate explicit contracts that may make
this function of a board less necessary. For example, a collective bargaining agreement might provide protection against layoffs, except in
cases in which the layoffs are expected to have dramatically positive
benefits for stock price. A more elaborate approach might create a
prediction market that would forecast the effect of possible decisions
on the welfare of current workers, for example represented by the
average salaries of those workers a decade later, whether or not the
workers are with the firm. The firm might then contract to considering possible strategic changes to maximizing the joint welfare of shareholders and labor, as determined by some weighting of this prediction
market with another market forecasting stock price. Less dramatically, the firm might contract to avoiding strategic changes that would
greatly harm workers and only slightly benefit the firm.
Implicit contracts are crude devices. Explicit contracts can
reduce the danger of opportunistic behavior and the need for overbroad protections against such behavior, thus increasing the potential
gains from contracting. Without prediction markets, however, there
would be no objective gauge of policy effects. If explicit contracting
relied on vague standards, -t might lead to expensive and unpredictable litigation. Alternatively, explicit contracting might rely on
detailed rules, and indeed labor contracts often do reflect this strategy, making these contracts analogous to the elaborate covenants we
have seen between firms and debtholders. But as in other legal contexts, rules can be expensive to draft and may be both under- and
overinclusive. At least in some cases, prediction markets provide an
escape from this dilemma, avoiding the need for both vague standards
and detailed rules.
208

Andrei Schleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in
33, 37-38 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).

CORPORATE TAKEOVERS

OTR"rDI DAME

1414

.

.

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

82:4

.

explicit contracting not only
Prediction markets can facilitate
but also with particular conwith broad constituencies such as labor,
or a particular manager. An
tracting customers, such as a customer
a corporation that uses prediction
executive might not agree to join
as it is in the firm's interest, in
markets to fire executives as soon
counsel against the use of prewhich case prediction markets might
an executive might agree to a condiction markets for dismissal. But
be fired only if the dismissal will
tract that allows the executive to
Such contracts can protect manbenefit the firm by a large amount.
arbitrary or opportunistic dismisagers and other key employees from
particularly bad performers.
sal, while allowing the firm to remove
CONCLUSION

look like they do because the
Ronald Coase explained that firms
exceed the sum of
benefits of hierarchy and command-and-control
20 9 Coase imagined that the boundaries,
agency and transaction costs.
change as the costs of various orgaand even existence, of firms would210
Prediction markets have the
nizational approaches changed.
costs of hierarchy while simultanepotential to profoundly reduce the
more decentralized organization
ously reducing the costs of
to predict the impact these
approaches. It is, of course, impossible
that we will see a greater heterogemarkets will have, but it is possible
firms or industries since prediction
neity of governance models across
of model choice through reduced
markets provide added flexibility
standard model-the Berle and
costs. More fundamentally, the
costs-may be in doubt as predicMeans firm beset by large agency
to
of market information processing
tion markets deploy the power
of the firm.
reduce agency costs within and outside
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